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PROSPECTIVE COMPENSATION IN LIEU OF A

FINAL INJUNCTION IN PATENT AND
COPYRIGHT CASES
H. Tomcis G6mez-Arostegui*
In a 2006 decision, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the U.S.
Supreme Court held that traditionalequitablefactors apply to injunctions
in patent and copyright cases, and therefore the mere fact that a defendant
has infringed a patent or a copyright does not necessarily mean a final
injunction must issue. In the three years since, lower courts have denied
final injunctions more frequently than before and are now struggling with
what relief, if any, to give prevailing plaintiffs in lieu of an injunction.
Some courts permit plaintiffs to sue again later. But most award
prospective relief to plaintiffs-sometimes a lump-sum damages award or
more commonly a continuing royalty--to compensate plaintiffs for the
defendant's anticipatedpostjudgment infringements. Plaintiffs often object
to prospective-compensationawards as constitutingcompulsory licenses.
This Article demonstrates thatfederal courts lack the authority, in either
law or equity, to award prospective compensation for postjudgment
copyright or patent infringements. Until Congress creates a new form of
compulsory licensing,future-damage awards and continuing royalties can
be granted in lieu of a final injunction only by consent of the parties. This
Article reaches its conclusion only after undertaking the most
comprehensive treatment of the subject to date. Apartfrom surveying the
relevant statutory texts, it relies on a historical review of future-damage
and continuing-royaltyjurisprudence in England and the United States
from 1660 to the present.

* Associate Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. Copyright H. Tomfs G6mezArostegui 2009. Special thanks to Ed Brunet, Brienne Carpenter, Jeffrey Graubart, Mark

Leeming, Lydia Loren, Susan Mandiberg, and Joe Miller for their comments on earlier
versions of this paper. This Article also benefited from comments received during
presentations at Lewis & Clark Law School, the Northwest Junior Faculty Conference at
Willamette University College of Law, and the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Southeastern
Association of Law Schools. Seneca Gray, Lisa Janicki, and Damien Munsinger provided
research assistance.
A word on terminology: The phrase "common law" appears numerous times in this
Article, and the reader should be made aware upfront that its meaning often changes
depending on the context in which I use it. In some cases, I use it to mean decisional or
judge-made law, as contrasted from legislative enactments. Yet in other cases I use it as a
shorthand for the practices of the common-law courts, as opposed to equity.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that
traditional equitable factors apply to injunctions in patent and copyright
cases, and therefore the mere fact a defendant has infringed a patent or a
copyright does not necessarily mean a final injunction should issue.2 The
decision altered long-settled expectations. In the three years since eBay,
lower courts have denied final injunctions more frequently than before and
are now struggling with what relief, if any, to give prevailing plaintiffs in
lieu of an injunction. Some courts permit plaintiffs to sue again. But most
award prospective compensation-sometimes a lump-sum damages award
or more commonly a continuing royalty-for future, postjudgment
infringements. Courts often do so over the objection of plaintiffs and
sometimes over the objection of infringers, thereby effectively creating a
compulsory license.
In the absence of a final injunction, many plaintiffs would prefer the
option of suing the defendant again. A subsequent suit might strengthen the
possibility of a willful-damages award, if the plaintiff could not previously
make one out, or ensure that the plaintiff will be entitled to a jury trial under
the Seventh Amendment for past damages rather than receive a bench trial
for prospective compensation (which is the route judges most often take).
Other plaintiffs fret that prospective awards destroy their ability to
exclusively license their rights to others. And at bottom, many would
simply prefer to determine the license terms of their patents without the
specter of compulsion by the court, even if lacking the leverage of a final
injunction. License terms are often interdependent and negotiating them is
much more complex than simply setting a royalty rate.
Defendants might also prefer that damages for future infringements be
heard by a jury in a separate suit, rather than by the trial judge. They might
favor compulsion-free negotiations, much as some plaintiffs would. But
defendants also have their own concerns at stake. For one, they might
disfavor lump-sum awards because of the possibility their infringements
will end sooner than expected. Many also prefer placing the onus on the
plaintiff to sue again-which in the best of worlds might never come to
pass--rather than being prospectively bound to pay for future
infringements. And though they would be loath to argue the point openly,
some defendants would sooner face a money judgment for past damages,
which typically would not be subject to a contempt sanction, than an
equitable decree for prospective compensation, which ordinarily would be.
In the wake of eBay and its progeny, scholars have begun to closely
examine the circumstances under which trial courts should grant final

1. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
2. Id. at 394. eBay involved patents, but the U.S. Supreme Court incorporated
copyrights into its opinion by referring to some of its prior copyright decisions. See infra
Part II.
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injunctions, particularly in patent cases. 3 Some have also opined on how
courts ought to calculate or structure an award of future compensation in
lieu of a final injunction. 4 Largely absent from the literature, however, is an
examination of whether federal courts actually have the authority to award
compulsory prospective compensation in lieu of a final injunction.
With few exceptions, 5 scholars and judges have assumed the courts do.
Their assumptions are understandable, given that several court decisions,
both pre- and post-eBay, have approved continuing royalties and lump-sum
damage awards in copyright and patent cases. But none of those decisions
has been rigorously questioned, and many proceed on unfounded
assumptions.
Indeed, when one examines those decisions closely,
considering their lack of precedent and reasoning, it becomes apparent that
they constitute a radical departure from federal court remedial authority.
The principal aim of this Article is to demonstrate that federal courts
have no authority to award compulsory prospective compensationwhether a continuing royalty or a lump-sum damages award-for
3. For patents, see James M. Fischer, The "Right" to Injunctive Relief for Patent
Infringement, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2007); Paul M. Schoenhard,
Who Took My IP?-Defending the Availability of Injunctive Relief for Patent Owners, 16
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187 (2008); for copyrights, see H. Tomds G6mez-Arostegui, What
History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law
Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197 (2008); and for trademarks, see Sandra Rierson, IP
Remedies After eBay: Assessing the Impact on Trademark Law, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J.
163 (2008). See generally Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge's Equitable Discretion
Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63 (2007).
4. E.g., Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of
Obtaining Permanent Injunctive Relief After eBay v. MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 437

(2008); George M. Newcombe et al., Prospective Relieffor Patent Infringement in a PosteBay World, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 549 (2008); Mitchell G. Stockwell, Implementing eBay:
New Problems in Guiding Judicial Discretion and Enforcing Patent Rights, 88 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 747 (2006); Tim Carlton, Note, The Ongoing Royalty: What
Remedy Should a Patent Holder Receive When a PermanentInjunction Is Denied?, 43 GA.
L. REv. 543 (2009); Eric Keller, Note, Time-Varying Compulsory License: Facilitating
License Negotiation for Efficient Post-verdict Patent Infringement, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 427 (2008).
5. Scholars have treated the subject under domestic law cursorily, relying primarily on
the absence of statutory authority. For copyrights, see 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON
COPYRIGHT § 22:75 (2009). For patents, see Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange: The ChangingLandscapefor Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH.
543, 565-72 (2008); Stockwell, supra note 4, at 755-56; Michael C. Brandt, Note,
Compulsory Licenses in the Aftermath of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.: The Courts'
Authority To Impose Prospective Compensatory Relieffor Patent Infringement, 17 FED. CIR.
B.J. 699, 707-09 (2008).
More in depth have been articles that address whether judicially imposed
compulsory licenses comport with the United States' obligations under articles 30, 31, and
44 of the TRIPS agreement. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Compulsory Licensing Under
TRIPS and the Supreme Court of the United States' Decision in eBay v. MercExchange, in
PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 557 (Toshiko
Takenaka ed., 2008); Harold C. Wegner, Injunctive Relief: A CharmingBetsy Boomerang, 4
Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 156 (2006); Charlene A. Stem-Dombal, Note, Tripping over

TRIPS: Is Compulsory Licensing Under eBay at Odds with U.S. Statutory Requirements and
TRIPS?, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 249 (2007).
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postjudgment copyright and patent infringements. Future-damage awards
and continuing royalties can be granted in lieu of an injunction only by
consent of the parties. Federal courts cannot impose these remedies on
plaintiffs or on defendants. Only Congress can create compulsory licenses
of this nature. Thus, a plaintiff who succeeds on the merits of her case but
who fails to obtain a final injunction must be allowed to periodically sue for
any subsequent infringements, if she so chooses. A defendant can also
refuse the granting of prospective compensation in lieu of a final injunction.
An incidental aim of this Article is to reveal that once the remedial
authority of the federal courts is properly understood, courts will discover
that in many of the cases where they denied final injunctions, they probably
should have granted them.
This Article proceeds in several parts. Part II describes how the Court's
decision in eBay has triggered a monumental shift in the way courts think
about final injunctions in copyright and patent cases. Part III then explores
the possible alternatives to granting a final injunction-viz., continuing
royalties, lump-sum awards, and successive actions-and focuses on their
implementation in cases decided after eBay. In the same section, I
demonstrate that the Supreme Court has yet to opine on the matter in a
conclusive way and that the Court thus remains free to consider the issue.
Given eBay's growing progeny, it seems likely that litigants will ask the
Court to do so in the near future.
Parts IV and V then turn to the first principles of my thesis-principles
that many courts have neglected. The ability of federal courts to grant relief
arises from two sources. The first is by an express statutory grant from
Congress. Part IV demonstrates that neither the Copyright Act of 1976 nor
the Patent Act of 1952 expressly authorizes the sort of prospective relief
that lower courts have granted in lieu of a final injunction. The second
source remains decisional law. It sets the default reach of a court's
remedial powers, and courts may use it to fill the interstices of a statute.
Part V explains, however, that not any judge-made law will do. The
Supreme Court has stated that a federal court cannot import a legal remedy
from the common law into a reticulated statutory scheme unless that
remedy was widely recognized at the time the statute was enacted. The
Court's approach for incorporating equitable remedies into a statute is even
more restrictive. A federal court's default equitable powers are limited to
the remedies the English Court of Chancery administered circa 1789--the
date our federal judiciary was founded.
Parts VI and VII then review prospective compensation in England and
the United States at common law and in equity from 1660 to the present.
Starting with England first, Part VI demonstrates that prospective
compensation for future infringements, which some courts have wrongly
characterized as a legal remedy, was not recognized at common law in
England. The common law specifically prohibited future-damage awards
when the claim at issue was a continuing tort subject to recurring causes of
action. Part VI then reveals that postjudgment damages for continuing
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wrongs only became available in England by statute in 1858, and as a
matter of equity practice, not common law. Prospective compensation
should therefore be classified as an equitable remedy and subject to the
more restrictive review for incorporating remedies. The section concludes
by demonstrating that the compulsory licenses awarded by federal courts
today are ultra vires because they were unknown in the Court of Chancery
in 1789.
Part VII then turns to American law. I begin by identifying in our
common law the same bar against future damages for continuing wrongs.
Though the cases later permitted prospective compensation for certain types
of real-property invasions, that case law fits poorly into the patent and
copyright statutes. Moreover, the remedy developed largely in equity,
thereby again confirming that U.S. decisional law decided long after 1789 is
immaterial in determining the default equitable remedies of the federal
courts. I conclude my review by considering several patent and copyright
cases that courts and commentators believe authorize imposing a continuing
royalty in lieu of an injunction. Those decisions, even if relevant, do not
assist courts because they are either inapposite, came after the enactment of
the statutes, or did not represent the general state of the common law.
Lastly, Part VIII shows that once the remedial history and authority of
the federal courts are correctly understood, it becomes evident that many
post-eBay decisions that have denied plaintiffs a final injunction constitute
an abuse of discretion. Most courts deny final injunctions because they
believe that they are authorized to impose prospective compensation in lieu
of an injunction and that such compensation therefore constitutes an
adequate remedy at law. Neither premise is correct.
II. MOVING AWAY FROM FINAL INJUNCTIONS

Until very recently, a plaintiff who succeeded on the merits in a patent or
copyright case, and who also demonstrated it was possible the defendant
would infringe in the future, nearly always received a final injunction.
Denials were usually left to cases where there was no threat of future
infringement; 6 the plaintiff had disentitled herself to equitable relief, such
as through undue delay or estoppel; 7 the amount the defendant had taken
was relatively de minimis; 8 or the public welfare counseled against a final
injunction. 9 The inadequacy of the remedies at law, which is often said to
be the sine qua non of an injunction, rarely determined an injunction
request on its own, largely because federal courts presumed that factor as a

6. E.g., Berry v. Haw. Express Serv., Inc., No. Civ. 03-00385SOM/LEK, 2006 WL
618894, at *3 (D. Haw. Mar. 9,2006).
7. E.g., Royal-McBee Corp. v. Smith-Corona Marchant, Inc., 295 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir.
1961); Blackburn v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 14 F. Supp. 553, 554 (S.D. Cal. 1936).
8. E.g., Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 209 U.S. 20, 23 (1908).
9. E.g., Ballard v. City of Pittsburgh, 12 F. 783, 786 (W.D. Pa. 1882); Bliss v.
Brooklyn, 3 F. Cas. 706, 707 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 1544).
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matter of law.' 0 Nor did the balance of hardships
matter. Defendants were
1
thought to have reaped what they had sown.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed these
sentiments in the copyright context when it stated that "as a general rule, a
copyright plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction when liability has
been established and there is a threat of continuing violations."'1 2 In patent
cases, the Federal Circuit similarly held that a final injunction will issue
adjudged, absent
once infringement and validity of the patent have been
13
exceptional circumstances to protect the public interest.
In 2006, the Supreme Court's decision in eBay squarely rejected the
Federal Circuit's rule, stating in a brief opinion that a plaintiff seeking a
final injunction, even in a patent case, must satisfy the following "wellestablished" test for an injunction:
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction. 14
10. Cf, e.g., Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 827-28 (9th Cir.
1997) (discussing preliminary injunctions).
11. Id. at 829-30. Early on, federal judges in Pennsylvania were more inclined to
dismiss patent suits in equity on the ground that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law,
see Sanders v. Logan, 21 F. Cas. 321, 323 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 12,295), or to deny
injunctions without dismissing the suit on the ground that the defendant would suffer a
severe hardship, see Elec. Smelting & Aluminum Co. v. Carborundum Co., 189 F. 710, 712
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1900); McCrary v. Pa. Canal Co., 5 F. 367, 368 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1880).
12. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); accord Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard
Dep't Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1555 (10th Cir. 1996); Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co.,
23 F.3d 1345, 1349 (8th Cir. 1994); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499 (11 th Cir. 1984).
13. KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
In 1992, Ralph Brown noticed that final injunctions were granted so often as "a matter of
course" that Donald Chisum did not even bother to discuss them in his comprehensive
multivolume treatise on the law of patents. See Ralph S. Brown, Civil Remedies for
Intellectual Property Invasions: Themes and Variations, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1992, at 45, 56 (1992). Even the 1999 edition of Chisum's treatise contained only two
sentences on the topic. See 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.04[2], at 20-761,

20-766 (1999).
14. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (citing Amoco Prod.
Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,
311-13 (1982)). Remedies scholars have questioned whether this four-factor test was in fact
well established. Many had never heard of it and were more accustomed to seeing a threefactor test at the final-injunction stage. See generally Tracy A. Thomas, eBay Rx, 2 AKRON
INTELL. PROP. J. 187, 190-91 (2008). I would add one further observation. Strangely, the
Court used the past tense when describing factors (1) and (by incorporation) (2)-a blunder
perhaps. Courts award injunctions to prevent irreparable harm in the future, not irreparable
harm in the past. Taken literally, the Court's test means that a plaintiff who quickly obtains
a temporary restraining order followed by a preliminary injunction--and who therefore will
not have suffered any palpable harm by the end of the case--will be unable to obtain a final
injunction. See also John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A
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District courts are to exercise their discretion to grant or withhold an
5
injunction in a manner "consistent with traditional principles of equity."'
The Court stressed that it had already reached the same conclusion in
copyright cases: "[We have] consistently rejected invitations to replace
traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction
automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been
infringed." 16 The Court had two cases in mind-New York Times Co. v.
Tasini17 and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 18 -in which similar
statements were made in dicta. Truth be told, however, those two cases,
(both of which I will turn to in a moment) had little if any impact on
injunction practice in copyright cases. 19 Perhaps recognizing as much, the
Court signaled in eBay that courts hearing copyright cases should have
taken, and certainly should now take, its prior dicta more seriously.
eBay has already had the desired effect on final-injunction practice in
patent cases. Courts have begun to deny final injunctions to successful
plaintiffs on grounds ignored in the past. And because the number of
potential reasons for denying final injunctions has expanded, the relative
number of denials has increased.
To begin with, the balance of hardships has found a renewed vitality.
Courts have begun to pay closer attention to the difficulties an adjudged
infringer will endure if the court issues a final injunction. 20 But more
importantly, courts are now also denying final injunctions because they no
longer presume that all remedies at law are inadequate. This "categorical"
presumption has been discarded in many cases, 2 1 and defendants have
sometimes convinced courts that plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law
for future infringements in the form of future damages or continuing
royalties. A judge in one case stated, for instance, that "given the fact there
are damages available and future damages available, it doesn't seem
Prescriptionfor Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REv. 657,

695-96 (2009) (also questioning this language).
15. eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.
16. Id. at 392-93 (citations omitted).
17. 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001).
18. 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994).
19. Accord 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 13.2.1.1, at 13:42 (3d ed.
Supp. 2008). Several cases had acknowledged these decisions. Most involved preliminary,
rather than final, injunctions, and none actually denied or directed the denial of an injunction
to a plaintiff who had succeeded on the merits. E.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista
Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 207 (3d Cir. 2003); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001); Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix
Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 608 n.1 1 (9th Cir. 2000); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d
104, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1998); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 932 n.19
(2d Cir. 1994).
20. E.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 442-44 (E.D. Tex.
2006).
21. E.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197,
1210-14 (C.D. Cal. 2007); MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 56869 (E.D. Va. 2007). I have argued elsewhere that decisions discarding the presumption in
copyright cases are erroneous. See G6mez-Arostegui, supra note 3, at 1207-10.
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irreparable ....
[A] compulsory license [will] adequately compensate" the
plaintiff.22 Another judge held that a plaintiffs future losses could "be

23
remedied via monetary damages."
Even when final injunctions are granted, some courts are reaching that
decision only after seriously considering 24 whether future, lump-sum
damages or ongoing royalties are appropriate.

III. ALTERNATIVES TO A FINAL INJUNCTION

Although the Supreme Court signaled in eBay that district courts should
more rigorously screen final-injunction requests, the Court never explained
what lower courts should do if they decide to deny a final injunction to a
plaintiff who has succeeded on the merits. The reluctance to opine on the
matter is understandable, as it was not squarely presented.
A. Supreme Court Guidance
The Supreme Court has, however, offered some guidance on the
subject--sometimes in dissenting opinions, other times in concurring
opinions, and at best always as obiter dicta. Justice Kennedy, for example,
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, offered one view in his
concurrence in eBay. He suggested that "legal damages" might be an
appropriate alternative:
When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed
simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be
sufficient to compensate25for the infringement and an injunction may not
serve the public interest.
Justice Kennedy offers little else. But given his obvious and demonstrated
understanding of the difference between legal damages and equitable
monetary relief,26 we must presume that by using the former he meant to
27
exclude a continuing royalty, which by its nature can only be equitable.
22. E.g., Transcript of Hearing at 125, Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05CV-264-RHC (E.D. Tex. July 6, 2006).
23. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006); see also Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs.,
Inc., No. CV-03-0597-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 920300, at *8 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2009);
Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (D. Del. 2007).
24. E.g., Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1310-11 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 600, 620-22 (D. Del. 2008);
Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d
600, 605-06 (E.D. Tex. 2007), rev'd on other grounds, 542 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Keg
Techs., Inc. v. Laimer, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
25. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., concurring).
26. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 253-58 (1993) (joining opinion of the
Court); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978) (noting that "legal" is a term of
art, which, when used to describe a remedy, is often used in contradistinction to the term
"equitable").
27. See infra text accompanying note 344.
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Less clear is whether he meant to exclude a lump-sum award of future
damages in lieu of a final injunction-which is also an equitable remedy (as
I will explain in Parts VI and VII below)-and meant to include only
28
subsequent actions for past damages.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in eBay is not the only time members of
the Court have suggested that some form of monetary relief might be proper
in lieu of a final injunction. The issue arose prior to eBay in three copyright
cases. In each case, the Court or some of its members stated that a final
injunction may not always be the appropriate way to remedy continuing
infringement. Moreover, the Court, or its members, went further in each of
these cases and suggested that future damages or a continuing royalty might
serve as the most sensible alternative to granting a final injunction.
Alternative relief first arose in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. 29-commonly known as the Betamax decision. There, the trial
court held that Sony was not directly or secondarily liable for copyright
infringement caused by the use of its videotaping machines. 30 The trial
court further stated that, even if it were to hold Sony liable, the court would
decline to grant a final injunction. 3 1 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding
that Sony had infringed. 32 It directed the trial court to reconsider whether a
final injunction was proper and declared that an award of future damages or
a continuing royalty might "very well be an acceptable resolution in this
context. '33 The court borrowed this latter suggestion from Melville
Nimmer, who had advocated for it in his treatise on copyright law. 34
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that Sony was not secondarily
liable for infringement. 35 The outcome mooted any need to discuss whether
a final injunction or an alternative form of relief, such as prospective
compensation, might be appropriate. But four dissenting justices-all of
whom believed Sony probably did infringe and that the majority had
reached the opposite conclusion to avoid a shutdown of the technology by
injunction-opined that "it seem[ed] likely that a broad injunction is not the

28. Paul Goldstein reads Justice Kennedy's concurrence to include not only a lump-sum
future damages award, but also a disgorgement of all the apportioned profits the defendant is
expected to earn from future infringements. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 19, § 13.2.1.1, at
13:39. Because the disgorgement of past profits in intellectual property is undoubtedly an
equitable remedy, rather than a legal one, it would seem a fortiori that Justice Kennedy
could not have meant to include an award of the defendant's future profits.
29. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
30. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432-33 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), ajfd in part, rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
31. Id. at 468-69.
32. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 977 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
33. Id.at 976.
34. Id. (citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06[B], at 14-53 to

14-54 (1981)). Melville Nimmer is therefore partly responsible for leading courts down this
path. See also infra note 325. For more on the influence wielded by the Nimmer treatise, see
Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CrN. L. REV. 581 (2004).
35. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,456 (1984).
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remedy that would be ordered."'36 Disclaiming any view on what precise
remedy they would have fashioned in the case, Justice Harry Blackmun
wrote that "an award of damages, or continuing royalties, or even some
may well be an appropriate means of balancing
form of limited injunction,
37
the equities in this case."
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Court briefly addressed the
issue again. The decision is best known for discussing parodic fair use, but
it also stated that the purposes of copyright were "not always best served by
automatically granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to have
gone beyond the bounds of fair use." 38 The Court did not expressly repeat
Justice Blackmun's suggestion in Sony that future damages or a continuing
royalty might be suitable replacements for a final injunction. Rather, the
Court more subtly indicated as much by citing with approval the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Abend v. MCA, Inc., 39 where that court had again
suggested that damages or a continuing royalty might be appropriate.
More recently, in 2001, a majority of the Supreme Court expressly stated,
albeit in dictum, that a continuing royalty might be proper. The issue in
New York Times Co. v. Tasini was whether freelance authors who had
previously published their articles in periodicals could later prohibit
republication in electronic databases. The Court held that they could
because the exceptions for "revisions" under 17 U.S.C. § 201 did not apply.
Responding to a concern that its holding would adversely affect the
availability of digital databases, the Court noted that "it hardly follows from
today's decision that an injunction against the inclusion of these Articles in
the Databases ...must issue." 40 The Court then suggested that litigants,
schemes
courts, and Congress could draw on the compulsory-licensing
4
utilized in other sections of the Copyright Act as an alternative. '
Though the Supreme Court's guidance on this subject cannot be cast
aside lightly, none of the aforementioned pronouncements is binding.
Some arose in dissents, others in concurrences, some only by reference, and
the remainder as obiter dicta. Moreover, the Court never once directly
stated that federal courts have the power to impose these prospective
remedies on the parties without their consent. The Court has thus never
directly confronted the issue and it remains free to fully consider what

36. Id. at 499 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).

37. Id. Bill Patry was given access to Justice William Brennan's papers in Sony, and
Patry recounts in his treatise that Justice Brennan doubted whether federal courts had the
authority to impose a continuing royalty. See 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22:75.
38. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (citing 17
U.S.C. § 502(a)).
39. 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 14.06[B], at 14-56.2 (1988)), affd on other grounds sub nom. Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
40. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) (citations omitted).

41. Id. On remand, the defendant mooted the issue by voluntarily removing all
infringing articles from the electronic database. See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 184 F. Supp.
2d 350, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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relief, if any, may be proper in lieu of a final injunction in patent and
copyright cases.
B. Post-eBay Cases
Post-eBay courts have utilized three approaches in lieu of granting a final
injunction: (1) continuing royalties; (2) lump-sum future damages; and (3)
successive actions. The continuing-royalty approach is fast becoming the
most popular alternative. Courts award continuing royalties to prevailing
plaintiffs, rather than permitting successive suits, to ensure that defendants
can continue to infringe unmolested, and often courts do so without the
plaintiffs consent. 42 Courts have also awarded lump-sum awards, but this
usually occurs at the request of plaintiffs during trial. Nevertheless, some
judges have indicated that they might award lump-sum damages over the
objection of plaintiffs, to say nothing of a defendant's objection to having to
pay an upfront fee. Lastly, a handful of post-eBay cases have provided for
no alternative relief at all, leaving plaintiffs to sue again periodically as
subsequent infringements occur.
1. Continuing Royalties for Future Infringements
Many courts permit the defendant to infringe the plaintiffs patent or
copyright so long as it pays a continuing royalty. In these cases, the court
orders the defendant to pay an amount per infringing product made or sold,
or a percentage of the defendant's gross revenues from the infringing
product. A continuing royalty is not a sum-certain award. It is instead a
contingent award whose total effect cannot be known until after the court
determines, on some periodic basis after judgment, the number of
postjudgment infringing products the defendant made or sold. An ongoing
royalty is an equitable remedy and has been treated as such by the cases. 4 3
Moreover, as a consequence of the in personam nature of the order, the
court retains the power to hold a defendant in contempt for failing to pay a
continuing royalty. 44 This approach differs from an ordinary money
judgment for past damages, which normally would be subject to a writ of
execution or other state-law process rather than coercive contempt. 45
Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc. 4 6 illustrates this approach. There,
the plaintiff owned a patent covering a method for communicating over a
42. E.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1194 (C.D. Cal.
2008) ("[T]he sunset [continuing-royalty] provision arises out of the Court's order, and is in

no sense dependent on the patentee's consent."); Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L,
2006 WL 2570614, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006) (declining plaintiff's suggestion to
"sever[] his action for monetary damages for post-verdict infringement").
43. See infra note 57.

44. E.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. CV 05-467 JVS (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28,
2008) (order granting in part and denying in part plaintiff's motion for contempt); see FED.
R. Civ. P. 70(e).
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 2007 (2006) (imprisonment for debt); FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a); see also
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Markarian, 114 F.3d 346, 349-50 (1st Cir. 1997).
46. No. I:05-CV-264-RHC (E.D. Tex. 2005-2008).
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satellite. A jury found the defendant had infringed the patent and awarded
$78.9 million in past damages based on a royalty rate of $1.32 per
infringing unit. The court declined to award a final injunction. Finisar did
not practice the invention, and the court took this to mean that Finisar
47
would not suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a final injunction.
The court instead granted a "compulsory license," that is to say, the
defendants were ordered to pay for the remaining life of the patent a higher
judge-imposed royalty of $1.60 per infringing unit. 48 Though the court did
not explain the legal basis for this award in a written order, a transcript from
the hearing makes clear that the court had relied on Foster v. American
Machine & Foundry Co.,49 a case I discuss below in Part VII.C.
Not long after Finisar,another judge from the same district ordered an
ongoing royalty. In PaiceLLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.,5° the plaintiff held
patents on hybrid drivetrain technology. The jury found for the plaintiff
and awarded damages for past infringement based on a reasonable royalty
of $25 per infringing vehicle. The district court denied the plaintiff a final
injunction, reasoning that the plaintiff would not suffer irreparable harm
without the injunction and that prospective compensation would be an
adequate remedy. 5 1 The judgment thus stated, "'Defendants are hereby
to pay Plaintiff an
ORDERED, for the remaining life of the '970 patent,
52
[vehicle].'
infringing
per
$25.00
of
royalty
ongoing
Both sides appealed. The Federal Circuit affirmed the award of a
continuing royalty but remanded for the district court to reevaluate the
royalty rate and provide a reviewable factual basis. 53 Relying on its
54
previous decision in ShatterproofGlass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co.,
and (incorrectly) on cases where the Supreme Court had approved the use
of royalties for antitrust violations, 55 the court held that in some
royalty for patent infringement in lieu
circumstances "awarding an ongoing 56
of an injunction may be appropriate."

47. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 22, at 125.
48. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, at 1-2 (E.D. Tex. July 7,

2006) (final judgment). Finisarwas later reversed because the district court had improperly
construed the patent claims. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1326
(Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 754 (2008). The Federal Circuit, therefore, did not

decide whether a continuing-royalty award was appropriate. Id. at 1339.
49. 492 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1974), cited in Transcript of Hearing, supra note 22, at 12627.
50. No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006).

51. Id. at *4-5.

52. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(quoting the district court).
53. Id. at 1315. Paice did not appeal the denial of the final injunction per se.
54. 758 F.2d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also infra Part VII.C.
55. See United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 59 (1973); see also infra text

accompanying note 421.
56. Paice, 504 F.3d at 1314. Concurring, Judge Randall Rader raised concerns over the
compulsory nature of the royalty, suggesting that the trial court should first seek the parties'
permission before setting the rate. Id. at 1316 (Rader, J., concurring). But ultimately, he
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Notably, the Federal Circuit also held that the ongoing royalty for future
infringements was an equitable remedy (correctly, I might add) and that
therefore Paice had no Seventh Amendment right to have a jury decide the
royalty rate. 57 This must be contrasted with cases holding that reasonable
royalties for past infringements are subject to the Seventh Amendment's
58
right to a jury trial.
In another recent case, a trial court adopted the royalty approach in lieu
of an injunction over the objection of the infringer. 59 The court denied a
final injunction after weighing the balance of hardships and focusing on the
patent holder's "showing of prospective harm, [and] how that harm may be
remedied."'60 The court then refused the infringer's request that the
patentee file new complaints on a quarterly basis as new infringements
arose. The court sided with the patentee's request to order an ongoing
61
royalty, which was "merely a nice way of saying 'compulsory license."'
The parties were ordered to confer on the possible license terms, and the
62
court indicated it would impose its own terms if the parties failed to agree.
2. Lump-Sum Damages for Future Infringements
As another alternative to a final injunction, a court might award the
plaintiff a single lump sum for all future infringements for the life (or a
shorter term) of the patent or copyright. In essence, the defendant would be
purchasing a nonexclusive license to continue the same form of
infringement into the future, subject only to the scope and restrictions
inherent in the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion or any terms set by
the court. The lump-sum approach differs from a continuing royalty in
concluded that if the parties could not agree then the trial "court would retain jurisdiction to
impose a reasonable royalty to remedy the past and ongoing infringement." Id. at 1317.
57. Id. at 1313 n.13, 1315-16; accordBoston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,
No. C 02-0790 SI, 2008 WL 5054955, at *2-5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2008) (order denying
counterclaim-plaintiffs motion for equitable relief); cf Keg Techs., Inc. v. Laimer, 436 F.
Supp. 2d 1364, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (labeling a "compulsory license" in lieu of a final
injunction an equitable remedy).
I take no position on whether Paice was correct to hold that no right to a jury trial
attached to this equitable remedy. The fact that a remedy is equitable is not dispositive of
the jury-trial right. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1962).
58. Kennedy v. Lakso Co., 414 F.2d 1249, 1250-54 (3d Cir. 1969); Swofford v. B & W,
Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 409-11 (5th Cir. 1964); Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,
550 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1119-23 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
59. Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
60. Id. at 986.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 986-87. For other cases where a defendant opposed a continuing royalty, see
Brief in Support of Resistance to Lincoln's Motion for Permanent Injunction and Alternative
Relief at 17-18, Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., No. 1:06-CV00110-MWB (N.D. Iowa Apr. 6, 2009), 2009 WL 960967; Defendant emsCharts, Inc.'s
Opposition to Plaintiff Golden Hour Data Systems, Inc.'s Motion for a Permanent Injunction
at 12-14, Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-381 TJW (E.D. Tex.
Jan. 21, 2009), 2009 WL 713168; Boston Scientific's Opposition to Cordis's Request for an
Ongoing Royalty at 14, Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 3:02-CV-00790
SI (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008), 2008 WL 4082594.
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several respects. The precise dollar amount of the award for all future
infringements is determined once and for all at the time of judgment.
Though the amount, of course, depends on proof that the future acts are
more likely to occur than not, the amount awarded does not depend on
whether those future events actually occur, as it does in the case of a
continuing royalty. Thus, as with any other judgment that awards lumpsum future damages, we may eventually learn that the amount awarded
overcompensated or undercompensated the plaintiff.
A hybrid form of relief-a lump sum and an ongoing royalty-was
awarded in Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbot Laboratories.6 3 The jury, after
finding willful infringement, awarded the plaintiff $7 million in damages.
A portion of that amount represented a market-entry fee of $5.8 million,
which contemplated not only past infringements but postjudgment
infringements as well. 64 The remaining $1.2 million represented a royalty
65
for past infringements only. The plaintiff obtained a final injunction.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the injunction because the
defendant had partially purchased a right to infringe. 66 It noted that, in
assessing a market-entry fee, the jury had not been "limited to a period from
the start of infringement to the date of judgment. ' 67 Consequently, the
award of $5.8 million was not for past infringement only. The Federal
Circuit held that "[w]hen a patentee requests and receives such
compensation, it cannot be heard to complain that it will be irreparably
harmed by future sales." 68 The case was remanded for the trial court to
according to the same
enter a compulsory license for postjudgment sales
69
royalty rate set by the jury for past infringements.
An award of future compensation in the form of the infringer's expected
profits from future infringements was recently sought in a high-profile
dispute between Mattel, Inc., maker of the Barbie doll, and MGA
Entertainment, Inc., maker of the Bratz dolls. 70 On August 26, 2008, a jury
found that MGA had infringed Mattel's copyrights in the Barbie doll. The
jury awarded Mattel $10 million in disgorged profits for the pretrial
infringement. 7 1 Notably, Mattel had also asked during trial for an award of
MGA's future profits, which the jury declined to give. Counsel for Mattel
conceded that such an award would have obviated the need for a final
63. 578 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
64. Id. at 1083; Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
65. Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., No. 05-C-0575-C, 2007 WL 5431017 (W.D.

Wis. Jan. 12, 2007) (order granting final injunction).
66. Innogenetics, 512 F.3d at 1380.
67. Id.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 1380-81.

70. MGA Parties' Opposition to Mattel's Motion for Permanent Injunction at 1, Bryant
v. Mattel, No. CV 04-9049 SGL (RNBx) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2008), 2008 WL 4721714
[hereinafter MGA Opposition].

71. Phase B Verdict Form as Given at 5, Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., No. CV 049049 SGL (RNBx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2008), 2008 WL 3915042.
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injunction. 72 The trial court eventually
granted Mattel a final injunction,
73
and the case is presently on appeal.
In the cases noted above, the plaintiffs sought an award of lump-sum
compensation at trial, perhaps because they preferred it to a final injunction.
The district court did not force it upon them (thought it might be said that
the award might have been forced upon the defendants). But at least one
district judge in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, a
district known for regularly hearing patent suits, has proposed in several
cases that he will ask juries to consider future damages (or continuing
royalties) at trial, even over the objection of a plaintiff,74 in order to
conserve judicial resources in the event he declines to enter a final
injunction at the conclusion of the case:
The parties are hereby advised that the court is considering submitting to
the jury a damages question regarding future damages, such as an ongoing
royalty rate....
In many cases, it makes sense to combine consideration of past and
future damages because, to some extent, many of the factors to be
analyzed are similar or even identical. Submission of an issue on an
appropriate ongoing royalty rate, or other appropriate future method of
calculating damages, to the jury may avoid the need for a later bench trial
on this 75issue, conserving the time and resources of the court and the
parties.
The same judge noted in another case that determining future damages or
royalties "in a patent case is no more difficult than the task commonly
performed by jurors in federal and state courts, when asked to calculate loss
of future earning capacity, future medical expenses, future pain and
' '76
suffering, or future lost profits.
3. New Actions for Future Infringements
The last alternative to granting a final injunction is to leave the plaintiff
to sue again as subsequent infringements occur. I have already described
77
why the parties might prefer this option over a compulsory license.

72. MGA Opposition, supra note 70, at 3-4.
73. Bryant v. Mattel, Inc., No. CV 04-9049 SGL (RNBx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008)
(order granting Mattel, Inc.'s motion for permanent injunction).
74. See Cummins-Allison Corp. v. SBM Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 916, 916-17 (E.D. Tex.
2008).

75. Seoul Semiconductor Co. v. Nichia Corp., No. 9:07-CV-273, at 1-2 (E.D. Tex. July
9, 2008) (order); accord Iovate Health Scis., Inc. v. Bio-Engineered Supplements &
Nutrition, Inc., No. 9:07-CV-46, at 1-2 (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2008) (order using identical
language as in the Seoul Semiconductor order); see also Amgen, Inc. v,F. Hoffmian-La
Roche Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160, 210 n.12 (D. Mass. 2008).
76. Ariba, Inc. v. Emptoris, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 914, 918 (E.D. Tex. 2008).
77. See supra Part I.
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z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.78 illustrates this approach. After
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the court, upon finding no
irreparable harm, denied the plaintiffs request for a final injunction. Any
future harm, the court held, "can be adequately remedied through the
recovery of monetary damages." 79 The court then declined to award
prospective damages. Instead, the court ordered the plaintiff to file a new
action to recover whatever damages would accrue from any new,
80
postverdict infringements.
Few courts post-eBay have expressly directed a plaintiff to sue again as
in z4. 8 1 But there exists an analog, and that is where the court denies a final
injunction and does not provide an alternative form of relief. By default, if
the defendant's infringement continues, the plaintiff has no other recourse
than to file another action. This analog appears to have happened in eBay
83
on remand 82 and in a number of other recent patent and copyright cases.
IV. No EXPRESS

STATUTORY GRANT

One of the most remarkable things about the cases discussed in Part III
above, and the many other cases I discuss in Parts VI and VII below, is the
courts that award lump-sum damages or a continuing royalty for future
infringements rarely consider, let alone cite, the copyright or patent statutes
for authority. With but few exceptions, the courts granting prospective
compensation never engage in any statutory construction.
This is
unfortunate given that litigants and courts should always begin (and must
sometimes end) their analysis with the applicable statute. But it is also
quite revealing. If courts granting continuing royalties believed the statutes
gave them the authority to do so, they would be citing them.
The sections that follow first review the statutes using conventional
statutory interpretation-viz., ordinary meaning and legislative history.
Subsequent sections consider whether federal courts can nevertheless
borrow and incorporate other remedies from the common law. 84 A review
of the statutes demonstrates that neither the Copyright Act of 197685 nor the

78. 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
79. Id. at 444.
80. Id. at 444-45. The Federal Circuit affirmed the verdict but was neither asked to
review, nor did it consider, the district court's denial of a final injunction. z4 Techs., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
81. E.g., Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Phillips Elec. N. Am. Corp., No. 2:04-CV-183,
2008 WL 819962, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2008).
82. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 590-91 (E.D. Va. 2007).
83. E.g., Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. C95-03577-DLJ,
2008 WL 4647384 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2008); Mon Cheri Bridals, Inc. v. Wu, Civ. No. 041739 (AET), 2008 WL 4534191, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2008); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys.,
Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 554 (D. Del. 2008); Wamer-Tamerlane
Publ'g Corp. v. Leadsinger Corp., No. CV 06-6531-VAP, at 20 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2008)
(order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment).
84. See infra Parts V-VII.

85. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2006).

1678

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 78

Patent Act of 195286 expressly allows prospective compensation. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 62 permits courts to impose continuing royalties
after judgment but only while staying an injunction pending an appeal.
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
The Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, provides no express statutory
basis for granting future compensation for postjudgment infringements.
The provision empowering courts to grant injunctions, for example,
cannot be read to permit an ongoing royalty or lump-sum, future-damages
award in lieu of an injunction. Section 502(a) provides,
Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title
may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title 28 [which governs
claims against the United States and its proxies], grant temporary and
final injunctions on such terms as it87may deem reasonable to prevent or
restrain infringement of a copyright.
First, the section mentions only "injunctions." A lump-sum award for
damages expected from future infringements is not an injunction. Nor is an
order that requires a defendant to pay an ongoing royalty for future
infringements. Both forms of prospective compensation differ from the
prototypical prohibitory injunction, which "restrain[s] a defendant from the
commission or continuance of some act," or the mandatory injunction,
'88
which orders a defendant to "restore things to their former condition.
Even if we could classify a prospective money award as an "injunction,"
that type of award would still fall outside the scope of § 502(a). An award
that permits the defendant to continue to infringe the plaintiffs copyright
upon the
payment of money
can
hardly
be seen
as
"prevent[ing] ... infringement of a copyright. '8 9 But perhaps Congress
meant something more expansive by also using the word "restrain." If a
continuing royalty or lump-sum award is an injunction, for purposes of the
statute, can we characterize such an award as one that "restrain[s]
infringement of a copyright"?
Putting aside for the moment that "restrain" often means "prevent" in its
first sense, 90 it also means to keep under control or within limits.9 1 Under
this definition, one can see how a continuing-royalty award (though not a
86. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006).

87. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a).
88. GEORGE TUCKER BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §§

400-401, at 512-16 (5th

ed. Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1893).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a).
90. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1936, sub restrain la (Phillip

Babcock Gove ed., 1986). Early treatise authors on intellectual-property law used the terms
"restrain" and "prevent" interchangeably and never with any apparent distinction. Take, for
example, the patent treatise written by George Curtis. Writing at a time when the Patent Act
utilized the word "prevent" rather than "restrain," Curtis entitled his chapter on injunctions:
"Of the Remedy in Equity to Restrain Infringements." GEORGE T. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF PATENTS 538 (4th ed. Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1873).

91.

WEBSTER'S,

supra note 90, at 1936, sub restrain lb.
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lump-sum award) might keep infringement under control. The defendant
must pay for each new infringement, and the total amount due will depend
on the number of infringing uses made. But whether a continuing royalty
would actually restrain the number of infringements is a factually intensive
issue. A rate of ten cents a unit (perhaps an entirely reasonable rate) on a
product that carries a profit margin of ten dollars might have no restraining
effect. It would seem, then, at the very least, that a continuing royalty could
only qualify under § 502(a) if it was designed to constrain and in fact would
restrain the infringing uses.
In any case, the point seems moot given that the history of the copyright
laws demonstrates that Congress intended "restrain" to be synonymous with
"prevent." Section 502(a) traces its origins to the first express grant of
injunctive authority in a statute from 1819, which had solely used the word
''prevent":
Be it enacted ... [t]hat the circuit courts of the United States[,] ...
upon any bill in equity, filed by any party aggrieved in any [copyright or
patent case], shall have authority to grant injunctions, according to the
course and principles of courts of equity, to prevent the violation of the
fights of any authors or inventors.., on such9 2terms and conditions as the
said courts may deem fit and reasonable ....
Subsequent amendments to the basic remedial provision retained similar
language until 1909. 93 In that year, Congress added the word "restrain" as a
miniscule part of its comprehensive overhaul of the copyright laws. Section
36 of the new statute empowered courts to enter injunctions "to prevent and
restrain the violation of any right secured" by the copyright laws. 94 The
legislative history of the law makes clear, however, that this change was
considered nonsubstantive. Commenting on a draft bill that contained the
new language, a House Report stated in 1907 that the "third paragraph in
section 29 [which contains the language relevant here and which was
eventually renumbered section 36] practically reenacts [the prior law],"
with the sole exception being new rules on the service of injunctions. 95 A
96
subsequent House Report in 1909 also carried the same commentary.
Importantly, the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976
demonstrates that Congress did not intend to alter prior law either. 97

92. Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481, 481-82.
93. E.g., Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 106, 16 Stat. 198, 215.
94. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 36, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084.
95. H.R. REP. No. 7083, at 16-17 (1907), reprintedin 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE

1909 COPYRIGHT ACT pt. N (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
96. H.R. REP. No. 2222, at 18 (1909), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
95, pt. S; accord ARTHUR W. WELL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 513 (1917) (noting that

section 36 was a reenactment of prior law).
97. An index of the legislative history relevant to § 502(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976
may be found in 3 THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT: A COMPENDIUM AND
ANALYTICAL INDEX OF MATERIALS LEADING TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, at 111-39
(Alan Latman & James F. Lightstone eds., 1983) [hereinafter KAMINSTEIN].
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The damages provision of the Copyright Act, § 504, also does not
expressly provide for prospective monetary relief. That provision states
that a copyright owner is "entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by
him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer
that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in
computing the actual damages." 98 The provision is susceptible, at least in
theory, to permitting some or all of the following forms of monetary relief:
(1) Damages the plaintiff suffered before judgment from infringements
occurring before judgment;
(2) Profits the defendant earned before judgment from infringements
occurring before judgment;
(3) Damages the plaintiff will suffer after judgment from infringements
occurring before judgment;
(4) Profits the defendant will earn after judgment from infringements
occurring before judgment;
(5) Damages the plaintiff will suffer after judgment from infringements
occurring after judgment; and
(6) Profits the defendant will earn after judgment from infringements
occurring after judgment. 99
The statute makes no mention of a reasonable-royalty award.10 0
The first two forms of compensation--(1) and (2)-are entirely
backward looking and expressly fall within the ambit of the statute. They
represent the typical forms of relief, are beyond reproach, and therefore
merit no further discussion. Equally clear is that the statute does not
expressly provide for the prospective compensation found in categories (3),
(4), (5), or (6).101 Indeed, one can go so far as to argue that the statute
98. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006).
99. An award under categories (1), (2), (3), or (4) is entirely compatible with the entry of
a final injunction, whereas an award under (5) or (6) is not and would preclude an injunction.
100. Nevertheless, it has long been recognized in the patent context that a reasonable
royalty can be used as a measure of category (1) awards. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn.
Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 649 (1915). One might thus argue the same for copyrights.
101. I have only a marginal interest in categories (3) and (4), and what I do have to say
about them can be outlined quickly here. It is not often that a court must decide whether an
infringement occurring before judgment creates postjudgment continuing losses (on the
plaintiffs side) or continuing gains (on the defendant's side) that stem from the same act or
acts of prejudgment infringement.

A handful of modem cases have permitted or

acknowledged the possibility of category (3) awards, so long as they are nonspeculative. See
Mary Ellen Enters. v. Camex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1065,

1069-70 (8th Cir. 1995); Applied

Innovations, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 876 F.2d 626, 637 (8th Cir. 1989); Cream
Records, Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 754 F.2d 826, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1985); Abeshouse
v. Ultragraphics, Inc., 754 F.2d 467, 470-71 (2d Cir. 1985); Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith
Clark, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 404, 408 (N.D. Ill. 1976). My subsequent analysis in Parts VI and
VII below demonstrates that those decisions are consistent with the common law prior to
1976.

Less clear is whether category (4) awards are permitted as a matter of equity. One
modem decision has assumed that they are, albeit without actually deciding the issue. See
Walker v. Forbes, Inc., 28 F.3d 409, 414 n.5 (4th Cir. 1994). Another court rejected an
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expressly prohibits categories (3) and (5) because of its use of the past tense
"suffered." How can a court state that a plaintiff has suffered a loss when
the court expects that very loss to occur in the future? Less clear is whether
the statute also expressly prohibits category (4) and (6) awards. The statute
does not use the past tense when referring to an infringer's profits. The
legislative history suggests, however, that with one exception, 10 2 no
material change was sought from the Copyright Act of 1909. That act had
10 3
more clearly limited disgorgement of profits to those earned in the past.
The fact that a prospective award for postjudgment infringements is
outside the express scope of § 502(a) and § 504 becomes even more
apparent when one considers other sections of the copyright statute. 10 4 In
§ 405(b), for example, Congress grants federal courts the power to grant
prospective compensation in lieu of a final injunction in a very limited
circumstance, namely where a person innocently infringes a work that was
published without the requisite copyright notice before March 1, 1989:
In a suit for infringement in such a case the court .

.

. may enjoin the

continuation of the infringing undertaking or may require, as a condition
for permitting the continuation of the infringing undertaking, that the
infringer pay the copyright owner
a reasonable license fee in an amount
105
and on terms fixed by the court.
Congress has also indicated in other sections that federal courts are not to
grant final injunctions where the defendant compensates the plaintiff for

award on the ground that it would be speculative. See Burns v. Imagine Films Entm't, Inc.,
No. 92-CV-2438, 2001 WL 34059379, at *5-5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2001). Bill Patry
believes future, postjudgment gains from prejudgment infringements are not permitted,
citing a Supreme Court decision that he believes prohibits a category (4) award under the
Copyright Act of 1909 and thus by implication the 1976 Act. See 6 PATRY, supra note 5,
§ 22:116 ("The recovery is actual, not future, profits." (footnote omitted) (relying on
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1940))). Patry's reading
of Sheldon is slightly off. He relies on a portion of the Sheldon opinion where the Supreme
Court states that "[t]he infringer is liable for actual, not for possible gains." Sheldon, 309
U.S. at 400 (internal quotation marks omitted). That statement quotes from Tilghman v.
Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 146 (1888), a patent case. Tilghman was not referring to future
profits. Rather, by stating that the recoverable profits were those the defendant actually
made, the Court meant to exclude profits the defendant could have made had she more
prudently run her own business. Id.; see also Dean v. Mason, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 198, 203
(1857); Livingston v. Woodworth, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 546, 549, 555-56 (1853). In any
event, my analysis of equity practice in Part VI.B, infra, demonstrates that Patry's ultimate
conclusion is correct.
102. The 1976 act cleared up whether actual damages and the disgorgement of profits
could be granted cumulatively. See ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 243-44 (5th ed.

1979).
103. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970) (1909 Act). An index of the legislative history relevant to
§ 504 of the 1976 Act may be found in 3 KAMINSTEIN, supra note 97, at 162-225.
104. Accord A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028-29 (9th Cir.
2001).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (2006).
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licenses may be
continued use of the copyrighted work. These compulsory
106
Act.
Copyright
the
of
provisions
found in numerous
In short, Congress knows precisely how to grant courts authority to
award prospective compensation, and its failure to do so in the contexts
that those contexts are not
discussed in this Article strongly indicates
107
susceptible to prospective monetary relief.
In light of the foregoing, federal courts would be hard pressed to hold
that the copyright statute expressly allows prospective compensation for
postjudgment infringements. Indeed, one could argue that the statute
expressly prohibits as much in light of its language and structure. But let us
assume for the sake of argument that the statute is silent on this point. One
must then determine whether Congress intended to incorporate prospective
awards by resorting to the general common law. That is a task I will turn to
shortly and in detail in Parts V-VII, where I focus on whether a lump-sum
future damages award or continuing royalty can be read into the statute.
B. The PatentAct of 1952
The Patent Act of 1952 also does not expressly authorize compensation
for postjudgment infringements. The statutory analysis of the Patent Act
largely tracks the analysis under the Copyright Act, with some exceptions.
Take the injunction provision for instance. Section 283 provides that "[t]he
several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the
violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems
reasonable."' 1 8 The provision is almost identical to § 502 of the Copyright
Act, and insofar as it differs the language is more restrictive. Whereas the
copyright statute states "prevent or restrain," the patent statute solely states
"prevent." As previously explained, a lump-sum award or continuing
royalty that allows future infringements can hardly be seen as preventing
violations. 109
The damages provision in the Patent Act also does not expressly
authorize prospective awards, despite its language being broader in some
respects than its copyright counterpart. Section 284 provides in part,
"Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,

106. See, e.g., id §§ 104A(d)(3), 112(e), 115, 118. Congress has also recently considered
empowering courts to award reasonable compensation in lieu of an injunction in cases
involving orphaned works. Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. § 2(a)
(2008); Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2008); cf
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(b) (1985) (legislating a continuing royalty in lieu of a final
injunction).
107. Accord Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985).
108. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).
109. Accord Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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together with interest and costs as fixed by the court."' 1 0 The provision is
susceptible, at least in theory, to permitting some or all of the following
forms of monetary relief:
(1) Damages the plaintiff suffered before judgment from infringements
occurring before judgment;
(2) A reasonable royalty for infringements occurring before judgment;
(3) Damages the plaintiff will suffer after judgment from infringements
occurring before judgment;
(4) Damages the plaintiff will suffer after judgment from infringements
occurring after judgment; and
(5) A reasonable royalty for infringements occurring after judgment."I '
As with the copyright statute, categories (1) and (2) are backward
looking and must fall within the ambit of the statute. The statute is silent,
however, with respect to categories (3), (4), and (5).112 Unlike the
copyright statute, § 284 contains no use of the past tense. As such, one
cannot argue that the statute expressly prohibits prospective money awards.
Other scholars have argued that we must nevertheless read an implicit
prohibition into the statute given Congress's repeated reluctance to amend
the Patent Act to permit more compulsory licenses. 113 As that ground has
110. 35 U.S.C. § 284. Notably, § 284 does not provide for the disgorgement of the
infringer's profits. Prior versions of the statute had allowed disgorgement, but a plurality of
the Supreme Court held in 1964 that Congress intended to eliminate that remedy when it
revised portions of the patent statute in 1946. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964) (Brennan, J., joined by Harlan, Stewart, White,
and Goldberg, JJ.). For a recent critique of the decision, see Caprice L. Roberts, The Case
for Unjust Enrichment Remedies in Patent Law, 14 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. (forthcoming
2010).
111. An award under categories (1), (2), or (3) is entirely compatible with the entry of a
final injunction, whereas an award under (4) or (5) is not and would preclude an injunction.
112. Once again, I have only a tangential interest in category (3) awards. Several patent
cases have addressed whether an infringement occurring before judgment can create
actionable postjudgment continuing losses on the plaintiffs side that stem from the same act
or acts of prejudgment infringement. In most cases, the courts have declined on the facts to
permit category (3) awards because the evidence presented was too speculative. See
Shockley v. Arcan, Inc., 248 F.3d 1349, 1362-64 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Oiness v. Walgreen Co.,
88 F.3d 1025, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977
F.2d 1555, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1992). But the awards have been held appropriate in other cases.
See Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1983); BIC Leisure
Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 134, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 1 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1993). For a lengthier discussion of category
(3) awards, see Christopher S. Marchese, Patent Infringement and Future Lost Profits
Damages, 26 ARiz. ST. L.J. 747 (1994). My subsequent analysis in Parts VI and VII
demonstrates that decisions allowing these awards are consistent with the common law as it
existed in 1952.
113. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in JudicialActivism in
Interpreting the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 10 TutL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 165, 204-05 (2007); Stockwell, supra note 4, at 756. The number of statutory
compulsory royalties for patents is small. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2183, 7608 (2006); cf. also 35
U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (eliminating the availability of injunctive relief against medical
practitioners). For an account of failed legislative efforts to add more from 1911 to 1946,
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already been covered, I will say nothing more about it here. Suffice it to
say, the statute neither expressly authorizes prospective awards nor does it
expressly prohibit them. We must therefore resort to an analysis of the
decisional law.
C. FederalRule of Civil Procedure62
Before turning to that inquiry, I must acknowledge that federal courts are
empowered to impose a continuing royalty or bonded lump sum for
postjudgment infringements in cases where a final injunction has been
ordered and the court has chosen to stay the injunction pending an appeal.
This occurs most often when a court has doubts about the merits of the case
or the propriety of the injunction.1 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62
broadly permits a trial court to protect a plaintiffs interests during appeal
and in a manner that could include royalties: "While an appeal is pending
from [a] . . .final judgment that grants . . .an injunction, the court may
suspend... [the] injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the
opposing party's rights."' 15 Similar language and powers may be found in
the corresponding federal rule of appellate procedure."16 Obviously a
plaintiff would likely not object to such interim measures. But a defendant
might, so these rules make clear that courts can impose them.
V. FEDERAL COMMON LAW

Let us now return to whether other remedies not within the express scope
of the copyright and patent statutes can be imported. Federal courts are
permitted to create substantive common law beyond what conventional
statutory interpretation reveals. Indeed, federal common law can develop in
various ways. In its broadest sense, courts can create law from scratch,
without any regulatory backdrop whatsoever, so long as the court has
subject-matter jurisdiction. This occurred previously, and most notably, in
diversity cases where no state statute provided the rule of decision.' 17 The
Supreme Court discredited that approach in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 118 but an exception persists today where the rights and
obligations of the United States are at issue.1 19 Admiralty and maritime are
see SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTS-A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

(Comm. Print 1950), reprinted in 1 RESEARCH STUDIES IN PATENT LAW:

1956-1963, at

Study No. 12 (1979).
114. E.g., On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1345 (Fed. Cir.

2006); Ven-Tel, Inc., v. Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc. (In re Hayes Microcomputer
Prods., Inc. Patent Litig.), 982 F.2d 1527, 1544-45 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 62(c).

116. FED. R. App. P. 8(a)(2)(E).
117. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
118. 304 U.S. 64(1938).
119. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 518 (1988); City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 334-35 (1981) (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall and Stevens, J.J.,

dissenting); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943).
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other areas where federal courts can create common law out of whole
20
cloth. 1
Federal common law can also arise when a federal statute or rule applies.
In rare cases, the rule or statute expressly instructs courts to create common
law.121 But more typically, courts create law by finding that Congress has
implicitly instructed them to do so. This might occur, for instance, by
recognizing a private cause of action in a federal statute that fails to provide
for one. 122 Other examples include where Congress expressly creates
jurisdiction over certain disputes without enacting meaningful substantive
provisions, thus leaving the courts to fashion them. 123 In other cases,
Congress does provide substantive guidance, but omits any mention of the
available remedies, and courts may then incorporate the remedies usually
24
available at law and equity. 1
Finally, in some circumstances an intricate statute carries all of the
above-jurisdictional, substantive, and civil remedial provisions--and yet
courts sometimes still incorporate other remedies recognized at common
law. 125 The following two sections discuss when legal and equitable
remedies, respectively, can be incorporated into an intricate statute.
A. Legal Remedies: General Common Law in 1952/1976
The Supreme Court has stated several times that Congress cannot be
expected to exhaustively legislate every rule of decision in a reticulated
statutory scheme. Justice Robert Jackson acknowledged the "futility of
attempting all-complete statutory codes,"' 26 and it has become common and
uncontroversial for federal courts to fill the interstices of federal statutes
and rules by drawing from the common law. Congress is presumed to
expect, and therefore presumed to intend, that courts will consider the
decisional backdrop when reading a statute. The source of the common
law-the what to look to-and the time frame to consider--the when to
look to-differ depending on the interest involved. Where the interest in
national uniformity is weak, federal courts may resort to the law of the
120. E.g., Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 259 (1979).
121. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 501.

122. E.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696-99 (1979).
123. E.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 450-51
(1957). In 2004, for example, the Court held that a private claim under the Alien Tort
Statute would be available, despite the statute being merely jurisdictional, insofar as the
claim would have been recognized circa 1789, the date the statute was enacted. See Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
124. Accord Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66-73 (1992).
125. United States v. Acme Process Equip. Co., 385 U.S. 138, 146 (1966); Cont'l Mgmt.,
Inc. v. United States, 527 F.2d 613, 620 (Ct. Cl. 1975); cf Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458-60 (1974) (noting that where "legislation
expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage
of the statute to subsume other remedies" unless "clear contrary evidence of legislative
intent" states otherwise, and holding that no such evidence existed in the case).
126. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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forum state as it existed at the date of the dispute giving rise to the
underlying claim. 127 In this sense, the court does not really create federal
common law, except insofar as it has ruled that courts should consult the
law of the forum state. But where the interest in national uniformity is
strong, federal courts must resort to a general common law as it existed
28
when Congress first enacted, or sometimes later reenacted, the law.1
Congress has already informed us that remedies under the Copyright Act
of 1976 are a matter in which national uniformity is paramount and that
resort to the law of the forum state is inappropriate. The Act expressly
preempts any state-law remedies that purport to govern "the subject matter
of copyright."' 129 Though no similar statement has been made with patents,
it seems safe to assume that Congress expected uniform patent remedies as
30
well.1
1. The "When" To Consider
Because Congress is deemed to legislate "against the backdrop of judicial
precedent,"' 3 1 the time at which courts are to assess the general state of the
law is usually limited to the date on which the statute was enacted. 132
Courts presume that Congress intended to retain "long-established and
familiar principles"' 133 unless the legislature has clearly indicated otherwise
in the statute or legislative history.' 34 Common-law developments that
occur after the enactment of a statute generally do not bear on the meaning
or intent of the original statute. Those developments become relevant only
when Congress reenacts the same statute without changes following a
sunset provision or as part of a comprehensive overhauling of the entire

127. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985); cf De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S.
570, 581-82 (1956) (defining "children" under § 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909 according
to the law of the forum state).
128. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989) (using common
law to define "employee").
129. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
130. Accord Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-39 (1964)
(preemption of state-law claims); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 227-31
(1964) (same).
One notable exception in both copyright and patent cases is prejudgment attachment.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64 provides that federal courts are to consider the
attachment law of the forum state. FED. R. Civ. P. 64(a); see, e.g., Walpole Woodworkers,
Inc. v. Atlas Fencing, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 247, 249 (D. Conn. 2002).
131. John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REv. 173, 196 (1999).
132. See Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655 (1962); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 49-59 (1911).
133. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
134. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542-44 (1994). For examples
where the patent statute modified prior judge-made law, see Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex
Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 653-57 (1983) (availability of prejudgment interest); Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964) (plurality) (availability of gainbased remedies). For an example of where it did not, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 3-4 (1966) (nonobviousness standard).
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statutory scheme or the relevant statutory section. 135 Congress is presumed
in those instances to have again considered the general state of the law.
The Supreme Court has occasionally permitted courts to consider the
state of the law at the time of the underlying dispute or the time of decision,
but those exceptions are inapposite. For instance, the Court has filled gaps
in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by looking not only to the law as it existed when the
law of
statute was first enacted in 1871, but also to the "modem" common137
Of
torts, 136 an approach that some Justices on the Court criticized.
course, being only one paragraph long, § 1983 is not an intricate statute.
The Court has twice considered modem developments when drastic
technological advancements rendered the meaning of "performance"
ambiguous under the Copyright Act of 1909.138 The Court consulted cases
decided long after the statute's enactment, along with the original purpose
of the provision. 139 And under the Patent Act, the Court has turned to later
case law140and technological developments when construing the term
"useful."
But these exceptions were also met with dissent' 4 ' and, in any
case, were not applied to expand the remedies available under the statutes.
2. The "What" To Consider
What qualifies as general common law? Several sources help reveal the
general state of the law, including English common law, federal common
law, and the common law (and in some cases statutory law) 142 of the states.

135. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1983); Francis v. S. Pac.
Co., 333 U.S. 445, 449-50 (1948).
136. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255-56
(1978).
137. Smith, 461 U.S. at 66 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J. and Powell, J.,

dissenting) ("The decisions of state courts decided well after 1871, while of some academic
interest, are largely irrelevant to what Members of the 42d Congress intended by way of a
standard for punitive damages."). For more on this topic, see generally Jack M. Beermann,
A CriticalApproach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 51 (1989); Jack M. Beermann, Common Law Elements of the Section 1983 Action, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 695 (1997).
138. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Fortnightly

Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1968).
139. In FortnightlyCorp. v. UnitedArtists Television, Inc., the Supreme Court stated,

[O]ur inquiry cannot be limited to ordinary meaning and legislative history, for this
is a statute that was drafted long before the development of the electronic
phenomena with which we deal here. In 1909 radio itself was in its infancy, and
television had not been invented. We must read the statutory language of 60 years
ago in the light of drastic technological change.
392 U.S. at 395-96.
140. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 530 (1966); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 310-18 (1980) (interpreting "manufacture" and "composition of matter").
141. Twentieth Century, 422 U.S. at 167-68 (Burger, C.J., joined by Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Brenner,383 U.S.
dissenting); Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 402-08 (Fortas, J.,

at 536-40 (Harlan, J., joined by Douglas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Accord Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590-91 (1990) (discussing statutory
law).
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English common law is most pertinent when the relevant time of inquiry
is close to the founding of our federal government and judiciary in the late
eighteenth century. Not surprisingly, our courts consult English law most
14 3
often when determining the existence vel non of a constitutional right.
This occurred in Crawford v. Washington, 44 where the Court overruled its
own Confrontation Clause jurisprudence as being inconsistent with English
and American common law extant in 1791, the date on which the Sixth
Amendment was adopted. 145 Last Term, the Court did the
same when
46
interpreting the scope and reach of the Second Amendment. 1
Naturally, the influence of English law decreases as more American
authorities become available. 14 7 The Court has turned more often to federal
common law and state law when the time for assessing the default state of
the law is further removed from the founding of our federal government and
judiciary. Just as soon as common themes can be discerned from American
law, English law plays less of a role-and where conflicting with American
law extant at the relevant time period, English law plays no role148-in
painting the backdrop against which courts must interpret legislative action.
3. Affirming the Approach
The Supreme Court has rarely had to decide whether to incorporate one
form of monetary relief into a federal statute that already expressly provides
for another. Most of the cases cited in the preceding sections dealt with
other common-law, nonremedial rules that the courts had incorporated into
statutory texts by implicit instruction. Nevertheless, in cases where the
question was whether to import a monetary remedy into an intricate statute,
the Court has followed the same approach noted above, with one notable
exception in copyright cases that actually seems more restrictive.
In Monessen Southwestern Railway Co. v. Morgan,149 the Court had to
determine whether to allow prejudgment interest to a prevailing plaintiff
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). The plaintiff was
injured in a fall and alleged it was due to his employer's negligence.
Though the statute provided for a "damages" remedy, 150 it made no
mention of interest, and thus to permit prejudgment interest would require
creating federal common law. The Court looked at the general state of the
common law at the time Congress adopted FELA in 1908 and discovered
that "the common law did not allow pre-judgment interest in suits for
personal injury or wrongful death."1 51 The Court refused to read an intent
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655-74 (1898).
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 42-54; accord Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 389-91 (1979).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2791-806 (2008).
See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990).
See id.; accordUnited States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892).
486 U.S. 330 (1988).
45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
Monessen, 486 U.S. at 337 (citations omitted).
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by Congress to abrogate that rule sub silentio, and therefore
held that
52
prejudgment interest could not be recovered under FELA.1
153
More important for our purposes is Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker,
an early copyright case brought for the infringement of an engraving. The
plaintiff owned the copyright in a map of the electric railways of the State
of Massachusetts. He sued a local newspaper for printing numerous copies.
At the time, the copyright statute provided for limited legal remedies for
infringing engravings-viz., a penalty of one dollar per sheet. 154 The
plaintiff sued at law for ordinary damages instead. The trial court dismissed
the claim, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed,
stating,
The property right being established, the common-law remedies attach,
whether the right arises out of the common law or under statute, unless
there is something in the statute to the contrary. This rule is so firmly
established in both the federal courts and the state courts that it is not
necessary that we should elaborate the topic. 155
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts could not read a
common-law damages remedy into the copyright statute. 156 In reaching its
decision, the Court stressed that it had previously held in Wheaton v.
Peters15 7 that no common-law copyright existed for published works under
U.S. or Pennsylvania law. The copyright statutes had created a new right,
rather than confirming an existing right. In essence, there was no commonlaw backdrop to consult, and no alternative remedies to import. The Court
concluded that where a statute creates a new right, one not previously
recognized at common law, and prescribes particular remedies, no other
remedies can be resorted to. 158 As "[i]nadequate [as the penalties] may be
to fully protect the property in the copyright, yet such as Congress has seen
fit to give, and which it, not the courts, have power to enlarge by
amendment of the statutes." 159 Three years later, in the case of Hills & Co.
v. Hoover,160 the Court reiterated that the "copyright statutes of the United

152. Id. at 337-39. The Court's commitment to reviewing the common law circa 1908
under FELA slipped slightly in another case. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512
U.S. 532 (1994), the Court was faced with a split in approaches on when recovery could be
had for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Both approaches existed at common law in
1908, but most states favored the "physical impact" test over the "zone of danger" test. The
Court nevertheless adopted the latter approach partly, it seems, because by the time of the
Court's decision use of the "physical impact" test had all but died out. Id. at 554-56. But see
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 164 (2003) ("The state of affairs when the
FELA was enacted [rather than the modem trend] is the more important inquiry.").
153. 210 U.S. 356 (1908).
154. U.S. Rev. Stat. § 4965 (1878).
155. Walker v. Globe Newspaper Co., 140 F. 305, 307 (1st Cir. 1905).
156. Globe, 210 U.S. at 367.

157.
158.
159.
160.

33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
Globe, 210 U.S. at 364-65.
Id. at 364.
220 U.S. 329 (1911).
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States afford all the relief to which
a party is entitled, and no action outside
1 61
of those provided therein will lie."'
One is tempted to stop here. Globe appears to prohibit incorporation of
any other remedy into the copyright and (by extension) patent 162 statutes
from prior decisional law. But it remains unclear whether that was the
intended reach of the decision and, if so, whether so broad an exclusion
remains today.
For one, to make Globe consistent with prior cases we must restrict its
holding to legal remedies. This follows because in 1854, the Supreme
Court held in Stevens v. Gladding163 that the equitable remedy of
disgorgement of the infringer's profits could be read into the copyright and
patent statutes despite those statutes saying nothing about profits. Relying
on an 1819 statute that had created a right to injunctive relief according to
the course and principles of equity, 164 the Court held that the statute had
conferred "the usual and known jurisdiction exercised by courts of equity
for the protection of analogous rights."' 16 5 This would have included a
"right to an account of profits [as] incident to the right to an injunction in
166
copy and patent-right cases."
Second, Globe may now be obsolete given that a damages remedy is
available for all infringements in patent and copyright cases. The Court
might be more willing today to look to the common law to incorporate other
legal remedies that are closely associated with ordinary damages.
Because it remains unclear what to make of Globe, I will later examine in
Part VII whether the general state of the common law--as reflected in
English common law, American federal common law, and state common
law-permitted an award of prospective compensation in either 1952, for
purposes of the Patent Act, or 1976, for purposes of the Copyright Act.
B. Equitable Remedies: English Equity in 1789
The process for determining whether an equitable remedy can be read
into a federal statute is more restrictive than the approach outlined above for
legal remedies. Rather than review the general state of the decisional law at
the time Congress enacted the statute-whether it be reflected in English
law, American law, or both-federal courts must instead inquire whether
161. Id. at 337 (citing Globe, 210 U.S. 356).
162. Given that no patents existed at common law either, see In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d
966, 985 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995); Monumental
Props. of Ga., Inc. v. Frontier Disposal, Inc., 282 S.E.2d 660, 662-63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981),
one can imagine the Supreme Court would have reached the same conclusion had it been
confronted with a patent claim.
163. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 447 (1854).
164. See supra text accompanying note 92 for the language of the statute.
165. Stevens, 58 U.S. at 455.
166. Id. In 1870, the patent statute was amended to expressly permit the recovery of the
infringer's profits. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206. An award of
profits was not expressly added to the copyright laws until 1909. See Copyright Act of 1909,
17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970).
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the equitable remedy at issue was recognized in the English Court of
Chancery circa 1789. Cases decided in American federal courts just after
that period are probative of English practice, but given the paucity of
decisions from that time, the sole courts of resort for all practical purposes
are the English Court of Chancery and, perhaps, the equity side of the Court
of Exchequer. Importantly, the subsequent development of new equitable
remedies in the decisional law of the United States does not matter.
The Supreme Court's decision to fix the place and date of assessment to
England in 1789 stems from its interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
1. The Judiciary Act of 1789
Article III of the U.S. Constitution gave Congress the authority to create
federal courts to hear "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made ... under
their Authority."' 167 Pursuant to that authority, Congress enacted the
Judiciary Act of 1789,168 which created federal courts that were limited
both in their jurisdiction and powers. Section 11 gave federal courts
original jurisdiction "of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in
equity,"' 169 but section 16 then limited the equitable jurisdiction to cases
where there was no "plain, adequate and complete remedy ... at law." 170
In doing so, Congress sought to adopt the separate systems of law and
equity prevailing in England at the time of the Judiciary Act, albeit without
also creating the physically separate courts and judiciary that England had.
The Supreme Court soon confirmed that the Act co-opted the practices of
the principal English courts, by which it may have first meant the rules of
procedure. The Court stated that it would consider "the practice of the
courts of King's Bench and Chancery in England, as affording outlines for
the practice of this court."1 71 Later, in 1818, the Court acknowledged that
the scope of English influence included not only procedure, but substantive
rules regarding remedies: "[T]he remedies in the courts of the United States
are to be, at common law or in equity . . . according to the principles of
common law and equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from
which we derive our knowledge of those principles.' ' 172 In 1854, the Court
then set the time in which to consider English equity practices. Federal
courts could not "exercise any equity powers, except those conferred by
acts of congress, and those... which the high court of chancery in England,
167. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
168. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
169. Id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78.
170. Id. § 16, 1 Stat. at 82 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 384 (repealed 1948)).
171. Rule, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 411, 413-14 (1792). In 1788, the year before Congress
created the federal judiciary, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania similarly stated that it had
the same powers as the common law courts of England. Lesher v. Gehr, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 330,
334 (Pa. 1788) ("The legislature, before the revolution, prescribed no rules for the supreme
court; but it is certainly vested with the powers of the King's Bench and Common Pleas in
England; and the practice has been, in general, governed by the same law.").
172. Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222-23 (1818).
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acting under its judicial capacity as a court of equity, possessed and
exercised, at the time of the formation of the constitution of the United
equity
States."' 73 The Court later stressed that the reach of, and powers in,
174
in the federal courts were not to be altered by the laws of the states.
The merger of law and equity in 1938, pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, had no effect on the substantive rules of equity. 175 In
1939, the Supreme Court simply reaffirmed the time in which to assess the
default equitable remedies of the federal courts. The equitable jurisdiction
conferred by section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was, according to the
Court, an "authority to administer . . . the principles of the system of
judicial remedies which had been devised and was being administered by
the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two
countries."' 176 The subsequent repeal of section 16 in 1948,177 as a belated
statutory cleanup following the new civil procedure rules, also mattered
little. The Court had previously held that section 16 merely declared
already long-established principles of equity jurisdiction.1 78
2. Reaffirming the Relevance of English Equity
The Court recently confirmed this approach in Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo,S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. 179 The issue presented was
whether in an action for money damages a federal court could issue a
preliminary injunction preventing the defendant from transferring assets in
which the plaintiff had no legally recognized interest, such as a lien. The
Court reiterated that "'[s]ubstantially . . . the equity jurisdiction of the
federal courts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of
Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the
enactment of the original Judiciary Act.' ' 180 Taking the matter one step
173. Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 384 (1854).
174. Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425,430 (1868).
175. Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n.26 (1949) ("Notwithstanding

the fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the substantive principles of
Courts of Chancery remain unaffected.").
176. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939); see also Guar. Trust
Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945) ("Equitable relief in a federal court is of course
subject to restrictions: [for example,] the suit must be within the traditional scope of equity
as historically evolved in the English Court of Chancery .... " (citations omitted)); Sprague
v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65 (1939) ("The suits 'in equity' of which [federal
courts] were given 'cognizance' ever since the First Judiciary Act, constituted that body of
remedies, procedures and practices which theretofore had been evolved in the English Court
of Chancery, subject, of course, to modifications by Congress." (citing Michaelson v. United
States, 226 U.S. 42 (1924))). See generally 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, JR., A TREATISE ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 285, at 533-34, § 294, at 571-76 (4th ed. 1918).

177. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 869, 996, repealing 28 U.S.C. § 384
(formerly section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789).
178. See Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932); Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138
U.S. 146, 150-51 (1891); Boyce's Ex'rs v. Grundy, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 210, 215 (1830).
179. 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
180. Id. at 318 (quoting A. DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
660 (1928)).
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further, the Court noted that "' [t]he substantive prerequisites for obtaining
an equitable remedy"' were not altered by Rule 65 and also depended on
equitable principles from circa 1789.181
Before turning to a review of traditional equity practice, the Court first
factually distinguished two of its own cases where it had allowed similar
relief in the past. 182 Then, following an investigation of various authorities,
the Court concluded that the relief requested was not one traditionally
accorded in equity. The Court specifically highlighted that the "English
Court of Chancery, from which the First Congress borrowed in conferring
equitable powers on the federal courts, did not provide an injunctive
remedy such as this until 1975."183 Notably, the Court also refused to
entertain policy arguments in favor of or against approving the relief sought
and relied solely on historical equity practice. 184 Congress was the only
appropriate forum to craft new equitable remedies.
The Court chose to treat equitable remedies differently than legal
85
remedies due to its "traditionally cautious approach to equitable powers."'
The reasons for caution are several. For one, a judge sitting as a chancellor
in equity typically operates without a jury. The more expansive equitable
powers become, the more likely they are to clash with legal issues, which
usually must be tried by a jury per the Seventh Amendment.1 86 Courts also
exercise a contempt power over equitable remedial orders that often has no
corollary when the remedy is legal, such as ordinary damages. Thus,
whereas the failure to comply with an equitable order might result in
coercive contempt, the failure to comply with a legal order ordinarily would
not. 187 It also seems that courts have often used their "powers in equity" as
an excuse to act wholly outside precedent or statutory authority, and the
88
Court was concerned that the courts could lose credibility in the process.1
Notably, the Court stressed that flexibility in equity remained, but only so
181. Id. at 318-19 (quoting 1 A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2941, at 31 (2d ed. 1995)).
182. In Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940), the Court had
approved a preliminary order freezing the assets of the defendant. The case differed from
Grupo, however, because the ultimate relief sought in Deckert was equitable rather than
legal. The Court in Grupo implicitly suggested that a federal court is more free to craft a
nontraditional interlocutory remedy when done in an effort to preserve its ability to
subsequently grant a traditional or statutorily recognized form of final equitable relief.
Grupo, 527 U.S. at 324-25. In the second case, United States v. First National City Bank,
379 U.S. 378 (1965), another interlocutory freeze order was approved, but the Court in
Grupo stressed that the authorization had not come from the Court's "general equitable
powers" but under a broad statutory authority, and that the creditor also held an equitable
lien on the property. Grupo, 527 U.S. at 325-27.
183. Grupo, 527 U.S. at 327.
184. Id. at 322, 329-32 ("We do not decide which side has the better of these
arguments.").
185. Id. at 329.
186. See id. at 330.
187. See supra notes 44-45.
188. Grupo, 527 U.S. at 332-33 (citing 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 19 (7th ed. Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1857)).
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remedies and
long as cabined within the silos of traditionally recognized
89
claims or when exercised pursuant to statutory authority. 1
Grupo is not an outlier. The Supreme Court has since further signaled its
desire to constrain federal court remedial powers in equity to those
remedies existing traditionally in equity or to those specifically listed in the
applicable statute. In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson, 19 0 a car accident left a person seriously injured and in need of
life-saving medical care. Her husband's health plan covered $411,157 of
the expenses. Great-West Life paid all but $75,000 of those expenses and
was entitled to recoup its payout in the event the insured received from a
third party any recovery by judgment, settlement, or otherwise. 19 1 When
the accident victim settled a tort suit against the car manufacturer for
$650,000, only $13,828 was sent to (but never accepted by) Great-West
Life as reimbursement. The remainder went to a trust for the victim's
92
medical care and to satisfy attorneys' fees and costs. 1
Great-West Life sued under the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) seeking reimbursement of the entire $411,157.
Federal court authority to grant this form of relief could be found, according
to Great-West Life, in section
502(a)(3), which expressly permitted
"appropriate equitable relief." 193 The trial court and court of appeals
rejected that argument, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Noting that the
ERISA statute was a "'comprehensive and reticulated statute,' [and] the
product of a decade of congressional study," the Court stated that it was
194
reluctant to recognize "remedies not specifically authorized by its text"
'
195
nor remedies other than those "'typically available in equity."
The
Court concluded that the "restitutionary" relief sought by the plaintiff
would not have been available in equity in the "days of the divided
bench,"' 196 by which it meant circa 1789.
Four Justices-Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer--dissented in
Grupo and Great-West, arguing that a federal court's power in equity has
always been and should always be expansive and dynamic. They argued in
Grupo, for instance, that the Court had previously defined the scope of
federal equity "in relation to the principles of equity existing at the
separation of this country from England," but had "never limited federal
equity jurisdiction to the specific practices and remedies of the pre-

189. Id. at 322.
190. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).

191. Another party who paid the remaining $75,000 assigned its recoupment interest in
that amount to Great-West Life. Id. at 207.
192. Id. at 207-08.
193. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.

§ 11 32(a)(3) (2006).
194. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 209 (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251
(1993)).

195. Id. at 210 (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256).
196. Id. at 212-14.
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Revolutionary Chancellor." 197 They pointed out that the Court had
previously condoned equitable remedies such as structural and divestiture
injunctions that were "beyond the contemplation of the 18th-century
Chancellor."' 198 The same Justices made similar arguments in GreatWest. 199
Several scholars have since argued that Grupo and Great-West illustrate
a shift in approach. Judith Resnik, for example, has argued that the
"majority is developing a new theory of limitations on the equitable powers
of the federal courts." 200 Stephen Burbank has posited that the Court in
Grupo "rewrote the history of remedies in equity."'20' And Tracy Thomas
has argued that the Court in Great-West was wrong to interpret "modem
remedial statutory language by historical reference." 20 2 It is not the purpose
of this Article to defend the Court's historical approach; that is a topic to
explore in another paper. I would only add that the Court is not taking an
all-new approach, but rather appears to be reviving an old one. Indeed, it
seems the Court has taken a page out of the playbook of the Reagan Justice
Department, which had urged federal courts to do just that.20 3 Whether the
approach is new, or even desirable, it establishes the doctrinal framework to
follow. Indeed, in the wake of Grupo, some lower courts have already
begun to reconsider the equitable remedies they have crafted in the past.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, recently
reexamined whether its previous rulings permitting the disgorgement of illgotten gains in securities-fraud cases remained valid. 20 4 After analyzing
early Chancery cases, along with treatises of the period, the Second Circuit
reaffirmed its previous holdings as correctly representing the state of
Chancery practice. 20 5 Similarly, in 2000, the Sixth Circuit examined
Chancery practice (albeit perfunctorily) in concluding that a court of equity
206
traditionally had no power to enjoin the importation of foreign goods.
197. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 336
(1999) (Ginsburg, J., joined in part by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citing
Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30, 36 (1935); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430
(1869)).
198. Id. at 337.
199. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 233-34 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer, JJ., dissenting).

200. Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies:
FederalPower, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 231 (2003).

The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and

201. Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations
on FederalJudicialPower-A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1296 (2000).
202. Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1063,
1065 (2003). Thomas proposes a "purpose" test in place of a historical inquiry for defining
the default equitable powers of the federal courts. Id. at 1065, 1083-86.
203. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATrORNEY
GENERAL, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW: A RECONSIDERATION OF THE "BROAD EQUITABLE
POWERS" OF THE FEDERAL COURTS iii (1988) ("Long-term reform would require federal
courts to recall the origins of Anglo-American equity and realize that there is no independent
authority for the federal judiciary to 'do equity.').
204. SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2006).
205. Id.
206. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 221 F.3d 924,927 (6th Cir. 2000).
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In light of the requirement to examine historical evidence when
incorporating decisional law into a reticulated statute, the following two
sections explore the historical use of prospective compensation in
England 20 7 and in the United States 20 8 during the relevant time periods.
VI. PROSPECTIVE COMPENSATION IN ENGLAND

As noted previously, lower courts have sometimes granted prospective
compensation in lieu of a final injunction in patent and copyright cases. In
some cases, the award was a lump sum, but more commonly it has been a
continuing royalty. An award of prospective compensation may seem
uncontroversial, given that courts and juries in other contexts have regularly
awarded lump sum, future damages to plaintiffs. But the fact remains that
future-damage awards were specifically prohibited at common law in
England when the claim at issue was a continuing tort susceptible to
recurring causes of action. Postjudgment damages in cases of continuing
wrongs eventually became available in England, but this occurred as a
matter of equity practice, not common law, and only because equity
jurisdiction was enlarged by statute in 1858.
In the sections that follow, I trace the development of prospective
compensation in the common-law courts of England and demonstrate that a
distinction emerged between single-wrong torts, which permitted awards of
future damages, and continuing torts, which did not. I then turn to English
equity practice with a view to proving that prospective compensation
constituted an equitable remedy when awarded for anticipated wrongs. In
light of that fact, and because the remedy is also properly considered an
equitable one in the United States, 20 9 the analysis of whether U.S. courts
can award damages for postjudgment infringements falls under the Grupo
line of cases and depends on English equity practice circa 1789. Evidence
from that time period demonstrates that no such award was recognized.
A. At Common Law
The legitimacy and origin of ordinary damages for past harms is
unquestionable and longstanding. Of ancient origin, we first see evidence
of its use in place of the liquidated b6t sometime in the 12th century. 2 10 But
an award for future losses is of relatively recent vintage. The default rule at
common law was that a plaintiff could only recover for damages sustained
up through the filing of the action, but not for damages occurring

207. See infra Part VI.
208. See infra Part VII.

209. See supra text accompanying note 57 and infra Part VII.B. 1.
210. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
522-25 (photo. reprint 1968) (2d ed. 1898).
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thereafter. 2 11 The rule prevented the jury from considering harms that had
occurred between the time the action was commenced and the time
the case
2 13
went to trial,2 12 and also posttrial harms that had not yet accrued.
The first published case to expressly recognize a jury's ability to consider
and compensate for future damages, at least in limited types of cases, was
Townsend v. Hughes in 1677.214 There, the jury had returned a verdict of
4000 pounds for the plaintiff on a claim of slander. The appeal is most
famously known for its discussion of exemplary damages, but the Chief
Justice of the Common Pleas also acknowledged that in certain slander
cases it was appropriate for the jury to consider future damages:
This is a civil action brought by the plaintiff for words spoken of him,
which if they are in their own nature actionable, the jury ought to consider
the damage which the party may sustain [in the future]; but if a particular
averment of special damages make them actionable, then the jury are only
to consider such damages as are already sustained, and not such as may
2 15
happen in future, because for such the plaintiff may have a new action.
The court thus stated that it was proper to consider future damages for
actions based on slander per se but not for those based on ordinary slander,
which required special damages as an element of the prima facie case. The
watershed nature and importance of Townsend is evidenced by the fact that
the first English treatise dedicated to the law of damages, which arrived
nearly one hundred years after the decision, cited Townsend as the leading
2 16
decision in its section on the damages recoverable in actions on the case.
Not long after, the King's Bench took the next logical step in Fetter v.
Beale2 17 and held that in cases where future damages were permitted, the
plaintiff would have to present evidence to the jury of potential future
damages or forever waive the right to complain about it. 2 18 The plaintiff in
Fetter had brought an action for battery. After obtaining a verdict in his
favor, the plaintiff filed a second action some time later against the same
2 19
defendant because his wounds from the original battery had worsened.
The defendant pleaded the judgment from the first action as a bar to the
second. The plaintiffs counsel, however, "urged this subsequent damage
was a new matter which could not be given in evidence on the first
211. See Walter v. Warren, 10 Mod. 273, 274, 88 Eng. Rep. 724, 725 (K.B. 1715);

Brasfield v. Lee, 1 Ld. Raym. 329, 329, 91 Eng. Rep. 1115, 1115 (K.B. 1698); Hamilton v.
Vere, 1 Lev. 299, 299, 83 Eng. Rep. 416, 416 (K.B. 1670).
212. Accord Bigott v. Rydley (K.B. 1497), reprinted in 115 SELDEN SOCIETY 338 (1998)

[hereinafter 115 SELDEN].
213. Accord Anon (C.P. 1494) (Bryan, C.J.), reprinted in 115 SELDEN, supra note 212, at
262, 263; 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 115 & n.2 (J.H. Baker ed., 1978).

214. 2 Mod. 150, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (C.P. 1677).
215. Townsend, 2 Mod. at 150, 86 Eng. Rep. at 994.
216. JOSEPH SAYER, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 53 (London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall

1770).
217. 1 Salk. 11, 91 Eng. Rep. 11, 12 Mod. 542, 88 Eng. Rep. 1506 (K.B. 1701).
218. Fetter, 1 Salk. at 11, 91 Eng. Rep. at 12, 12 Mod. at 542, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1506.
219. Fetter, 1 Salk. at 11, 91 Eng. Rep. at 11.
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recovery, when it was not known." 220 The Court of King's Bench held that
the first action barred the second because the subsequent harm to the
plaintiff was not a new tort but simply a potential "consequence"
of the
22 1
original battery, which the original jury could have considered.
Apart from espousing a principle of claim preclusion, the case reinforced
the principle recognized in Townsend that future damages were only
permitted as a matter of common law for some types of claims but not
others. Whereas Townsend singled out slander per se as permitting future
damages, Fetter added another tort: battery. 222 Importantly, in reaching
this conclusion, the court distinguished other types of claims where future
damages would not be permitted and therefore where subsequent actions
would not be barred by claim preclusion. Those were actions the court
characterized (albeit somewhat fictionally in the examples it gave) as
involving continuing wrongs:
And this is not like the case of a nuisance in erecting a penthouse,
whereby the rain falls upon my house or garden; or stopping my lights,
wherein I shall recover damages for every new hurt in infinitum: for, first,
the battery is a transitory act, and the nuisance is a continued one as long
as it lasts; therefore damages cannot be recovered for it at once: secondly,
every new rain that falls, or every light that is stopt, is a new nuisance; but
every new223
ill consequence of the battery is not any new wrong of the
defendant.
Battishill v. Reed 224 further demonstrates the distinction between singlewrong torts and continuing torts. The plaintiff sued the defendant for
constructing a building whose eaves and gutters overhung the plaintiffs
wall. The Court of Common Pleas held that the jury was not permitted to
award the plaintiff permanent (i.e., future) damages for the diminution in
value of the plaintiffs property, and that therefore evidence tending to
prove as much was inadmissible. 22 5 The court noted that the defendant was
22 6
instead "liable to another action for the continuance of the nuisance."
From these cases and others, the English common law developed a
demarcating line between single-wrong torts and continuing torts. Every
treatise to study damages recognized the distinction. John Mayne thus
noted in his influential treatise in 1856 that "where the damages subsequent
to the commencement of the action are not the necessary result of the
alleged wrong, or where they might be the foundation of a fresh action, they

220. Fetter, 1 Salk. at 11, 91 Eng. Rep. at 12.
221. Id.
222. Accord Hodsoll v. Stallbrass, 9 Car. & P. 63, 173 Eng. Rep. 741 (Q.B. 1839), 11 Ad.
& E. 301, 113 Eng. Rep. 429 (Q.B. 1840).
223. Fetter, 12 Mod. at 544, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1507. For an earlier case that held nuisance

was often a continuing cause of action, see Beswick v. Cunden, Cro. Eliz. 402, 78 Eng. Rep.
646 (K.B. 1592/3).
224. 18 C.B. 696, 139 Eng. Rep. 1544 (C.P. 1856).

225. Battishill, 18 C.B. at 713-14, 139 Eng. Rep. at 1551.
226. Battishill, 18 C.B. at 714, 139 Eng. Rep. at 1551.
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cannot be included in the verdict of the jury." 227 David Nasmith similarly
recognized in 1879 that "[w]here the continuance of a wrong gives a fresh
ground of action, the damages must be assessed on the cause or causes of
action declared on, and future damage cannot be considered. ''2 28
Importantly, William Hindmarch connected this concept to claims of
patent infringement in 1846, stating that a "Court of Law has power only to
give a patentee damages for any injury he may have sustained by the actual
' 229
violation of his right, after it has been committed.
It is true that the law eventually changed in England, but this occurred
because a new rule of civil procedure in 1883 modified the practices of the
common-law courts. The rule permitted courts at common law to assess
damages for continuing wrongs up to the date of assessment, which usually
meant through the time of trial. 230 Litigants understood this more liberal
assessment was meant to be transsubstantive and thus applied to patent and
copyright infringements. 231 The rule did not, however, permit courts to
assess damages expected to occur after judgment, regardless of how
"permanent the source of the mischief may [have been], and however
improbable it may [have been] that the defendant [would] discontinue
it."' 232 English common law largely adheres to these limitations today. 2 33
B. In Equity
Postjudgment damages in cases of continuing wrongs also became
available, but this occurred as a matter of equity practice, not common law,
and only on account of equity jurisdiction being enlarged by statute in 1858.
The Chancery Amendment Act, 234 known colloquially as Lord Cairns' Act,
empowered the Court of Chancery to award "damages" in cases where the
Chancery had jurisdiction to entertain an application for an injunction
against the commission or continuance of any wrongful act. Importantly,

227. JOHN D. MAYNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 35 (London, H. Sweet 1856).
228. DAVID NASMITH, THE INSTITUTES OF ENGLISH ADJECTIVE LAW § 279, at 247-48

(London, Butterworths 1879).
229. W. M. H1NDMARCH, A TREATISE

ON THE LAW RELATING TO PATENT PRIVILEGES FOR

THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS 305 (London, V. & R. Stevens et al. 1846).

230. Rules of Supreme Court, 1883, Order 36, Rule 58 ("Where damages are to be
assessed in respect of any continuing cause of action, they shall be assessed down to the time
of the assessment."); see also Hole v. Chard Union, [1894] 1 Ch. 293 (C.A. 1893).
A similar rule already existed in equity, which allowed the Chancellor to assess the
disgorgement of a defendant's gains down to the time of the master's assessment in
Chancery, rather than to the date of the filing of the bill of complaint. See infra note 253.
231.

See VALE NICOLAS, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO LETTERS PATENT FOR

INVENTIONS 210 (1904).
232. JOHN W. SALMOND, THE LAW OF TORTS 117 (2d ed. 1910); accord PETER M.
MCDERMOTT, EQUITABLE DAMAGES 123 (1994) ("[Tlhis procedural reform [fell] short of
allowing damages to be awarded for prospective loss after judgment.").
233. See HARVEY McGREGOR, McGREGOR ON DAMAGES §§ 9-024 to 9-036, at 348-56
(17th ed. 2003).
234. Chancery Amendment Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c. 27.
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the Chancellor could award to a plaintiff the future damages she was likely
to suffer from a continuing wrong in the absence of an injunction:
[I]t shall be lawful for the same Court, if it shall think fit, to award
Damages to the Party injured, either in addition to or in substitutionfor
such Injunction[ ]... and
such Damages may be assessed in such Manner
235
as the Court shall direct.
Much like an injunction-the quintessential equitable remedyprospective compensation remedied anticipated rather than accrued wrongs.
The main prerequisite was that the Chancery initially had to have
jurisdiction over the matter. Thus, the denial of the injunction had to be on
a discretionary rather than jurisdictional basis. 236 These "permanent
damages," as they were sometimes called, were only available in equity and
237
therefore were (and remain) properly labeled as an equitable remedy.
Ironically, Peter McDermott notes that this authority to award
prospective compensation was likely unintentional: "It was certainly not by
design, for it appears that Sir Hugh Cairns had assumed that the measure
would vest the Court of Chancery with the same jurisdiction that the courts
238
of law possessed to 'give retrospective relief by way of damages."'
Nevertheless, the cases later interpreted the Act to permit future damages.
Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. 239 illustrates a post-Lord
Cairns' Act case. The defendant, an electric company, had been accused of
creating a continuing nuisance by engaging in public works near the
plaintiffs property. The trial court found that the defendant had created a
nuisance, but rather than award a final injunction, the court awarded
permanent damages to cover all harm-past and future. 240 On appeal the
court held that the injunction should have issued, and it remanded the case
for that purpose. But the judges also acknowledged in dictum that Lord
235. Id. § 2 (emphasis added). The Act was also interpreted by some to permit the
Chancellor to award a plaintiff her past damages instead of the infringer's profits. See
MCDERMOTr, supra note 232, at 29, 35. Earlier copyright cases had held that the Chancery
had to send the issue of actual damages to law so that it could be tried by a jury. See
Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385, 400, 38 Eng. Rep. 380, 386 (Ch. 1826). Despite the new
power, equity judges were reluctant to use it and continued sending damage assessments to

juries. MCDERMOTr, supra note 232, at 35. For an argument that the Chancery could (and
sometimes did) award past damages as a general matter before Lord Cairns' Act in 1858, see
Peter M. McDermott, Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery To Award Damages, 109 L.Q.R.
652 (1992). Conversely, an amendment to the Patent Act in 1852 gave common-law courts
the power to issue injunctions and disgorge the defendant's profits. Patent Law Amendment
Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., c. 83, § 42; THOMAS WEBSTER, THE NEW PATENT LAW 36-37 (4th
ed. London, Chapman & Hall 1854).
236. See HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY & RONALD HARLING MAUDSLEY, MODERN EQUITY
739 (Jill E. Martin ed., 13th ed. 1989); R. P. MEAGHER ET AL., EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND

REMEDIES 609 (2d ed. 1984).
237. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 232, at 1; Teck H. Ong, Equitable Damages: A
Powerful but Often ForgottenRemedy, DEAKIN L. REv., 1999/2000, at 61,64.

238. McDERMOTT, supra note 232, at 34 (emphasis added) (quoting 149 HANSARD'S
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES col. 1162 (Apr. 15, 1858)).
239. [1895] 1 Ch. 287 (1894).
240. Id. at 300-01 (Kekewich, J.).
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Cairns' Act had conferred a "jurisdiction to award damages which did not
to be
exist before." 24 1 Courts now had the option, though still rarely
242
exercised, of granting future damages in lieu of a final injunction.
Given the lack of a future-damages award at law for continuing wrongs,
one might have expected the Chancery to have stepped in to fill the void
before 1858, much as it did in other areas where the remedy at law was
deficient, and fashion its own form of prospective compensation. In a very
real sense, it did step in by awarding prevailing plaintiffs final injunctions
in nearly all intellectual-property cases. But in terms of prospective
monetary relief, the records of the Chancery demonstrate that in and before
1789, the court never once awarded a continuing royalty or lump sum in
lieu of a final injunction in infringement cases. Rather, in cases where a
plaintiff succeeded on the merits, the court took only one of three possible
avenues. It awarded (1) a perpetual injunction alone; (2) a perpetual
injunction along with a disgorgement of the defendant's profits; or (3)
nothing at all, leaving the plaintiff to bring an action at law at a later date.
To begin with, if a plaintiff pursued an infringement case to the hearing
and succeeded on the merits, the plaintiff could expect to receive a final
injunction. The Court of Chancery would grant a final injunction as a
matter of course unless the harm to the plaintiff was de minimis, 243 the
plaintiff had unduly delayed or acquiesced, 244 or the plaintiff had come to
court with unclean hands. 245 This was the route the court took 24in8
247 The court's decision in Hills v. Lee,
copyright 246 and patent cases.
which involved a copyright granted by letters patent, and as such was a
fusion of sorts of the two rights, demonstrates the default principle as early
as 1684. There, the court's register noted that
where it appeared to this Court that there was a right as it doth in this
Case[,] the Law having determined the same for the [plaintiff,] Itt was
Naturall for the Court to give releife for the same in specie[,] And doth
therefore thinck fitt & soe orders and decrees that the Injunction \formerly
249
granted in this Cause by order of the [date] bee made perpetuall/ ....

241. Id. at 311 (Halsbury, J.).
242. Id. at 316 (Lindley, J.); see also id. at 319 (Smith, L.J.). For more on Lord Cairns'
Act and prospective damages in equity, see MCDERMOTT, supra note 232, at 31-38; J. A.
Jolowicz, Damages in Equity-A Study ofLord Cairns'Act, 34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 224, 235-39

(1975). For more on the primacy of final injunctions over equitable damages in English law,
see ANDREW BURROWS, REMEDIES FOR TORTS AND BREACH OF CONTRACT 391-99 (2d ed.
1994).
243. Whittingham v. Wooler, 2 Swans. 428,431, 36 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (Ch. 1817).
244. Baily v. Taylor, 1 Russ. & My. 73, 73, 76, 39 Eng. Rep. 28, 28-30 (Ch. 1829).
245. Cary v. Faden, 5 Ves. jun. 24, 25-26, 31 Eng. Rep. 453, 453-54 (Ch. 1799).
246. G6mez-Arostegui, supra note 3, at 1232-33.
247. Liardet v. Johnson, 1 Y. & C.C.C. 527, 532, 62 Eng. Rep. 1000, 1004 (Ch. 1780);
accord Neilson v. Harford, Web. Pat. Cas. 373, 373 (Ch. 1841); Russell v. Cowley, Web.
Pat. Cas. 471, 471 (Ch. 1834).
248. sub nom. Hills v. Wright, C33/261, fols. 282v-283r (Ch. 1683/4).
249. Id.
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The Chancery also awarded monetary compensation in copyright and
patent cases, but its authority to do so was extremely limited and it never
encompassed infringements expected to occur after a final decree. In 1737,
and perhaps even earlier, the court began to award prevailing plaintiffs an
accounting and disgorgement of the defendant's profits arising from the
infringement. 2 50 Thus, in Gay v. Walker,2 51 after finding that the defendant
had infringed the plaintiffs copyright, the Lord Chancellor entered a
perpetual injunction and ordered the defendants to pay their profits over to
the plaintiff:
His Lordshipp doth thinke fit and so Orders and Decrees That the
Injunction formerly granted in this Cause to stay the Defendants from
printing publishing and Vending the said Book be perpetual and It is
further Ordered and Decreed That It be referred to Master Eld one [of the
masters in this court] to take an Accountt against the several Defendants.
• . [and they are] to be Examined on Interrogatoryes as the said Master
shall direct

. .

. [and] the said Master is to make unto the said Defendants

all just allowances and what upon the said Accountt shall be formed due
from the severall Defendants after all just allowances deducted[.] It is
Ordered and Decreed That the said Defendants... do respectively pay the
same to the Plaintiff as the said Master shall Direct .... 252
The master in ordinary assigned to a case-Master Francis Elde in the
example noted above-was permitted to assess the defendant's profits
down to the time of the hearing before him, rather than being limited to the
profits earned before the filing of the complaint. 253 In most cases, however,
this liberal practice of assessment was unnecessary. When requested,
interlocutory injunctions were nearly always granted in copyright cases and
perhaps only slightly less often in patent cases. 2 54 The defendant's
infringement was thus typically suspended, save of course for recalcitrance.

250. See RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT To Copy 65-69 (2004). I say
"perhaps even earlier" because I have been unable to find a case before 1737 that orders the
defendant to pay his profits over to a plaintiff. Yet a much earlier case, Wolfe v. Payne,
C33/30, fol. 143v (Ch. 1563/4), suggests that the Lord Keeper was inclined to do so. After
preliminarily enjoining a defendant from printing certain books, the court ordered that the
defendants would "be answerable for the said [books] alredye solde and uttred as this court
shall adiudge." Id. Regrettably, because the case was sent to arbitration the court never had
to decide whether to compensate the plaintiff. C33/32, fol. 256v (Ch. 1565).
251. sub nom. Bailer v. Watson, C33/369, fols. 315v-316v (Ch. 1737).
252. Id.
253. Accord Adams v. Dowding, 2 Madd. 53, 59-61, 56 Eng. Rep. 255, 257 (Ch. 1816);
Bulstrode v. Bradley, 3 Atk. 582, 582, 26 Eng. Rep. 1136, 1136 (Ch. 1747); Carleton v.
Brightwell, 2 P. Wins. 462, 463, 24 Eng. Rep. 815, 815 (Ch. 1728). The Patent Amendment
Act of 1852, see supra note 235, empowered common-law courts with certain powers of
courts of equity in patent cases, which included disgorging profits until judgment. See
Holland v. Fox, 3 El. & BI. 977, 985-86, 118 Eng. Rep. 1407, 1410-11 (Q.B. 1854).
254. For copyrights, see G6mez-Arostegui, supra note 3, at 1237; for patents, see Hill v.
Thompson, 3 Mer. 622, 624-25, 36 Eng. Rep. 239, 240 (Ch. 1817).
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Lord
In any event, upon conclusion of the matter before the master, the
2 55
Chancellor would then, if requested by a party, enter a final decree.
A disgorgement of profits at the close of the suit became available in all
forms of cases, whether they involved copyright under the Statute of Queen
Anne, 256 copyright at common law (for so long as it lasted) for both
published works 257 and unpublished works, 2 58 copyright by letters
patent, 259 or patents of invention. 260 The award of profits was not
mandatory, however, and the plaintiff sometimes waived it. 26 1 This might
occur, for example, where an interlocutory injunction had rendered the
defendant's gains trivial or nonexistent, thereby making any efforts to
recover them a senseless waste.
The Chancery's authority to order a disgorgement of profits, however,
was incidental to the award of the perpetual injunction. No injunction
meant no monetary compensation from the Chancellor. This practice
reflected a form of equity cleanup in which the Chancellor would retain the
matter in cases where he had granted final relief. Doing so avoided the
multiplicity of suits that would arise if a litigant, after having received a
final injunction, was required to then go to law to recover for past damages.
(Most plaintiffs also probably preferred an award of the defendant's profits
instead of actual damages because of the difficulty of proving they had
actually lost sales of their legitimate product to a pirated version.) If the
Chancellor denied a successful plaintiff a final injunction, the practice was
to then leave the plaintiff to her remedy at law for retrospective relief.
This practice first began, quite sensibly, with the Chancellor's reluctance
to delve into a money award when the plaintiff had not prayed for an
injunction at all. In Jesus College v. Bloom, 262 the plaintiff filed a bill of
complaint seeking an account and satisfaction against a tenant who had
wrongfully cut down timber during the term of his estate. An injunction
was not sought because the tenant's estate had terminated and he therefore
could not commit further waste. 263 The Lord Chancellor dismissed the bill
on the ground that an award of money in equity would have depended at the
255. 1 JOSEPH HARRISON ET AL., THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 420-22
(London, A. Strahan 1796); 2 HENRY MADDOCK, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 347 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1815).

256. E.g., Beckford v. Hood, C33/500, fol. 504r-v (Ch. 1798).
257. E.g., Becket v. Donaldson, C33/439, fols. 26r-27r (Ch. 1772).
258. E.g., Mason v. Murray, C33/452, fols. 486r-487r (Ch. 1779) (amount of profits
stipulated).
259. E.g., Pyle v. Falkener, C33/442, fols. 309v-31 Ir (Ch. 1774).
260. E.g., Crossley v. Derby Gas Light Co., Web. Pat. Cas. 119, 119 (Ch. 1834).
261. E.g., Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 338, 352, 355, 40 Eng. Rep. 956, 962-63 (Ch.
1838) (trademark); Fradella v. Weller, 2 Russ. & My. 247, 250, 39 Eng. Rep. 388, 389 (Ch.
1831) (engraving); Liardet v. Johnson, 1 Y. & C.C.C. 527, 532, 62 Eng. Rep. 1000, 1004
(Ch. 1780) (patent of invention); Macklin v. Richardson, C33/436, fols. 35v-36r, Amb. 694,
697, 27 Eng. Rep. 451, 452 (Ch. 1770) (unpublished play); Baskett v. Parsons, C33/329,
fols. 418v-419r (Ch. 1718) (copyright by letters patent).
262. 3 Atk. 262, 26 Eng. Rep. 953, Amb. 54, 27 Eng. Rep. 31 (Ch. 1745).
263. Jesus College, 3 Atk. at 262, 26 Eng. Rep. at 953.
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very least on a prayer for an injunction.2 64 "[I]n bills for injunctions, the
court will make a complete decree, and give the party a satisfaction," but
there was "no precedent" for such relief where no injunction was prayed. 265
In the absence of such a request, the plaintiff would have to seek his remedy
at law for past damages in an action for trover.
Lord Chancellor Eldon later acknowledged this principle in a case
involving copyright by letters patent, albeit without having to apply it. In
Grierson v. Eyre,266 the holder of the office of King's Printer in Ireland

sued the holder of the same office in England for exporting statute books
into Ireland. The suit was designed to seek a declaration of those rights and
an "account of the profits received by the Defendants for printing and
distributing the copies directed for Ireland.'' 267 Eldon refused to recognize
an equitable title, and suggested the plaintiff go to law for a declaration of
his rights.26 8 Because the plaintiff had not requested an injunction, the
defendants urged Lord Eldon to dismiss the bill outright, rather than hold it
pending the outcome of any case at law. When the plaintiff stated that he
would not be bringing an action at law and that he planned to remain in
Chancery, Eldon dismissed the bill. 269
Some years later, the Court of Chancery noted that apart from having to
seek an injunction, the plaintiff would also have to obtain the injunction
before an award of profits could be made. In Baily v. Taylor,2 70 a copyright
case, the Vice-Chancellor denied a request for an interlocutory injunction
because the plaintiff had delayed nine years in bringing suit and the value of
the case was minimal. 27 1 Despite this setback, the plaintiff pressed forward
to the final hearing, this time requesting a final injunction to prevent future
infringement and an award of profits for past infringement. The Master of
Rolls denied the injunction again, on the same basis as before, 272 and then
264. Jesus College, 3 Atk. at 262-64, 26 Eng. Rep. at 953-54, Amb. at 55-56, 27 Eng.
Rep. at 31.
265. Jesus College, 3 Atk. at 262-63, 26 Eng. Rep. at 953-54; accord Richards v. Noble,
3 Mer. 673, 673, 36 Eng. Rep. 258, 258 (Ch. 1807); Smith v. Cooke, 3 Atk. 378, 381-82, 26

Eng. Rep. 1018, 1020 (Ch. 1746). An exception was created for what the courts came to call
equitable waste. See Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, 1 Madd. 116, 137-38, 56 Eng. Rep. 44, 52
(Ch. 1815); Garth v. Cotton, Dick. 183, 211, 21 Eng. Rep. 239, 249 (Ch. 1753). There also
was a preexisting exception for cases involving the digging of mines. See Bishop of
Winchester v. Knight, 1 P. Wms. 406, 407-08, 24 Eng. Rep. 447, 448 (Ch. 1717).
266. 9 Ves.jun. 341, 32 Eng. Rep. 634 (Ch. 1804).
267. Grierson, 9 Ves. jun. at 343, 32 Eng. Rep. at 635.
268. Grierson, 9 Ves. jun. at 345-46, 32 Eng. Rep. at 635-36.
269. Grierson, 9 Ves. jun. at 346-47, 32 Eng. Rep. at 635-36; accord 3 HORACE Twiss,
THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE OF LORD CHANCELLOR ELDON 447-48 (London, John Murray

2d ed. 1844).
270. 1 Russ. & My. 73, 39 Eng. Rep. 28, Taml. 295, 48 Eng. Rep. 118 (Ch. 1829).
271. Baily, 1 Russ. & My. at 73, 39 Eng. Rep. at 28, Taml. at 299 n.1, 48 Eng. Rep. at
119 n.l.
272. The Court pointed out that the denial of an interlocutory injunction did not
necessarily foreclose a final injunction after a full hearing. 1 Russ. & My. at 76, 39 Eng.
Rep. at 30, Tamil. at 301, 48 Eng. Rep. at 119. For recognition of the same principle in a
patent case, see Bacon v. Spottiswoode, 1 Beav. 382, 387-89, 48 Eng. Rep. 988, 990 (Ch.
1839), affd sub nom. Bacon v. Jones, 4 My. & Cr. 433, 41 Eng. Rep. 167 (Ch. 1839).
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had to decide whether to nevertheless award profits for the infringements
that had already occurred. 273 He held he could not: "[T]he injunction being
that
refused, there can be no account." 274 Accordingly, the court suggested
275
the plaintiff seek his remedy at law in an action for any past damages.
The same principle applied in patent-of-invention cases. The plaintiff in
Smith v. London & South-Western Railway Co. 276 had also delayed in
bringing suit, and the Chancery declined the plaintiffs request for an
injunction of any kind. Hoping to nevertheless receive an award of profits,
an
the plaintiff argued that an account could be "decreed without granting 277
injunction, to which an account in such cases is not necessarily incident.
The Vice-Chancellor disagreed, holding that "[u]nless that primary right to
an injunction exists, this Court has no jurisdiction with reference to a mere
question of damages." 278 Once again, the bill was dismissed and the
plaintiff was left to an action at law.
As these cases demonstrate, the Chancery's ability to award monetary
compensation in copyright and patent cases was limited. The court could
only grant compensation where the court had also granted an injunction.
This, of course, meant that all equitable money awards in intellectualproperty cases were only backward looking. 279 The injunction prevented
future harms while the award of profits compensated the plaintiff for past
harms. It should thus come as no surprise that I found no evidence of the
Court of Chancery ever granting a continuing royalty or lump-sum award as
an alternative to a perpetual injunction in a copyright- or patentinfringement case (or any similar type of case for that matter).2 80 A
plaintiff was simply sent to law to recover any damages as they accrued.
Such was the state of the law in 1789,281 which is the time period that
dispositively defines the default equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts.

273. Baily, Taml. at 305, 48 Eng. Rep. at 121 ("That the publication of these tables is a
").
piracy is out of doubt ....
274. 1 Russ. & My. at 76, 39 Eng. Rep. at 30.
275. Id.
276. Kay 408, 69 Eng. Rep. 173 (Ch. 1854).
277. Smith, Kay at 412, 69 Eng. Rep. at 175.
278. Smith, Kay at 415, 69 Eng. Rep. at 176; accord Price's Patent Candle Co. v.
Bauwen's Patent Candle Co., 4 K. & J. 727, 70 Eng. Rep. 302 (Ch. 1858).
279. This also explains why category (4) awards should not be read into the copyright
statute. See supra note 101.
280. Cf Ball v. Coggs, 1 Bro. P.C. 140, 1 Eng. Rep. 471 (H.L. 1710) (specific
performance); Chamberlaine v. Newte, 7 Bro. P.C. 3, 3 Eng. Rep. 2 (H.L. 1706/7) (tithes).
281. Not much should be made of the fact that the latter two cases-which held that a
plaintiff had to have obtainedan injunction in order to obtain past profits---came after 1789.
The substantive law in the Court of Chancery was the same in all material respects between
1789 and 1858, and there is thus no reason to believe that the Chancery would have ruled
any differently in 1789 had it been confronted with the same factual scenario. The delay in
reaching this question in a published report likely stems from the fact that upon making out a
successful claim, a plaintiff typically received the final injunction she had requested, thereby
satisfying the necessary predicate. The Court would then award disgorgement of the
defendant's profits as a natural incident of the injunction, unless of course the plaintiff
declined the award.
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Eventually, these equity procedures were modified following the
enactment of Lord Cairns' Act in 1858, but the changes simply underscore
that prospective awards were not permitted in equity circa 1789. Apart
from permitting an award of future damages in lieu of an injunction, a
procedure that I described above, 2 82 the Act also gave courts of equity the
power to award money regardless of whether the court had actually granted
a final injunction, so long as the court otherwise had jurisdiction over the
cause at the filing of the bill. 283 Lord Cairns' Act thus broadened what
qualified as equity cleanup. Similarly, the Patent Amendment Act of 1852,
which conferred on common-law courts powers similar to equity courts in
patent cases, had been interpreted in 1854 to allow
common-law courts to
284
disgorge profits in the absence of an injunction.
The rule from Lord Cairns' Act allowing prospective compensation
persists today as section 50 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.285 Most
modern examples in England where the court awards prospective
2 86
compensation in lieu of a final injunction involve real property.
Nevertheless, there have been efforts to extend the jurisdiction to patent and
copyright cases. Those efforts have been relatively recent because English
courts historically granted final injunctions as a matter of course in most
intellectual-property cases. 287 English courts have rejected nearly every
2 88
attempt to extend prospective damages to patent or copyright cases.
These courts have expressed a reluctance to grant what amounts to a
compulsory license not specified by Parliament in the applicable statutes.
Indeed, I know of only a single reported case-a copyright suit-where
the court granted the plaintiff a prospective award in lieu of a final
injunction. The case-Banks v. EMI Songs Ltd.2 89 -was decided in 1996.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 234-42.
283. See Davenport v. Rylands, 1 L.R.Eq. 302, 306-08 (Ch. 1865); Johnson v. Wyatt, 2
De G. J. & S. 18, 20-21, 46 Eng. Rep. 281, 282 (Ch. 1863); Catton v. Wyld, 32 Beav. 266,
267-68, 55 Eng. Rep. 105, 105-06 (Ch. 1863).
284. Patent Law Amendment Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., c. 83, § 42; Holland v. Fox, 3 El.
& BI. 977, 985-86, 118 Eng. Rep. 1407, 1410-11 (Q.B. 1854); Vidi v. Smith, 3 El. & BI.
969, 973-76, 118 Eng. Rep. 1404, 1406-07 (Q.B. 1854).
285. Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 50 ("Where the Court of Appeal or the High
Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for an injunction or specific performance, it
may award damages in addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction or specific
performance.").
286. E.g., Tamares (Vincent Square) Ltd. v. Fairpoint Props. (Vincent Square) Ltd.,
[2007] EWHC (Ch) 212; Regan v. Paul Props., [2006] EWHC (Ch) 1941, rev'd, [2006]
EWCA (Civ) 1391; Jaggard v. Sawyer, [1995] 2 All E.R. 189 (C.A. 1994); Miller v.
Jackson, [1977] EWCA (Civ) 6; Shaw v. Applegate, (1977) 1 W.L.R. 970 (C.A.); Wrotham
Park Estate Co. v. Parkside Homes Ltd., [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798 (Ch. 1973).
287. See 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 1220,

at 653 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1890); G6mez-Arostegui, supra note 3, at 1237.
288. For patent cases, see Chiron Corp. v. Organon Teknika Ltd. (No. 10), [1995] F.S.R.
325 (Ch. 1994); Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Pic., [1993] R.P.C. 475 (Ch. 1992). For copyright
cases, see Ludlow Music Inc. v. Williams, [2002] EWHC (Ch) 638; Phonographic
Performance Ltd. v. Maitra, (1998) 2 All E.R. 638 (C.A.); Macmillan Publishers Ltd. v.
Thomas Reed Pub'lns Ltd., [1993] F.S.R. 455 (Ch. 1992).
289. [1996] E.M.L.R. 452 (Ch.).
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The preeminent treatise on U.K. copyright law calls this decision "wholly
exceptional. '290 In Banks, the plaintiff alleged that the musical group
UB40 had infringed her copyright in song lyrics. The court denied the
request for a final injunction because the plaintiff primarily sought
compensation and the defendant had been using the lyrics for eleven years:
"She wants an injunction in order to negotiate a price. ' 2 9 1 In the end, the
court did not state whether it would order a continuing royalty or a lumpsum award. Rather, it stated only that "the best way to proceed is that there
' 292
should be a claim as to how much that sum should be."
Most recently in July 2009, the House of Lords issued an opinion that
might best be described as an analog to the Supreme Court's decision in
New York Times Co. v. Tasini,293 at least insofar as creating dictum. In
Fisher v. Brooker,294 the High Court denied a request for an injunction
because the defendant was unlikely to infringe the plaintiffs copyright
again. 295 The court, however, implicitly reserved the right to reconsider the
request. The case ultimately made its way to the House of Lords where
numerous substantive issues were addressed. 29 6 The plaintiff did not appeal
the denial of the final injunction. In obiter dictum, the Law Lords stated
that in the event the High Court decided to reconsider granting the
injunction on the merits, the trial court was not obligated to grant the
29 7
injunction and might instead consider granting damages in lieu thereof.
These modem English cases simply underscore the novelty of
prospective compensation in lieu of a final injunction in copyright and
patent cases.

Grupo tells us to stop here. Because prospective compensation for a
continuing wrong is an equitable remedy, federal courts can only impose
such an award on both parties if (1) Congress expressly empowered them to
do so or (2) the English Court of Chancery recognized the remedy around
1789. Neither circumstance is present here. Developments in U.S. case
law are irrelevant. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, the
following section rounds out my review by considering American cases
decided prior to the patent and copyright statutes in 1952 and 1976,
respectively. Special attention is paid to cases that lower courts have cited
as authority for imposing prospective compensation in lieu of an injunction.
290. COPINGER & SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT § 22-151 (Kevin Garnett et al. eds., 15th
ed. 2005). U.K. scholars have recently turned their attention to this subject. See Gwilym
Harbottle, Permanent Injunctions in Copyright Cases: When Will They Be Refused?, 23
EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 154 (2001).
291. Banks, [1996] E.M.L.R. at 457.
292. Id. at 459.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
294. [2006] EWHC (Ch) 3239.

295. Id. [87]-[89].
296. Fisher v. Brooker, [2009] UKHL 41 (appeal taken from Eng.).
297. Id. [16]-[19] (Walker, L.J.); id. [74]-[75] (Neuberger, L.J.).
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VII. PROSPECTIVE COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Not surprisingly, the rule in the United States at common law tracked the
approach in England as it existed before the English legislative changes. If
the damage stemmed from a discrete wrongful act-such as a battery-the
plaintiff was permitted to recover (and had to seek or forgo) nonspeculative
damages for future losses stemming from that wrongful act. But if the
wrong was a continuing one, on account of actionable acts or omissions,
and whose ongoing occurrences or omissions could form the basis for
separate actions, then a prospective award was not permitted, and the
plaintiff would be limited at trial to recovering only those damages that
occurred up through the filing of the action.
This remains the basic approach today. Plaintiffs are still permitted to
recover prospective damages for single-recovery torts, though that label is
rarely used. The limitation on future damages for continuing torts also
remains, but with two exceptions. First, more liberal rules of procedure
now allow parties to recover for harms incurred between the filing of the
action and up through the time of judgment. And second, courts have
recognized that in certain cases involving invasions to land, torts
traditionally deemed "continuing" should instead be labeled "permanent,"
thereby allowing an award of future damages. Nevertheless, the trend in
those cases is to severely limit when such an award can be imposed on a
plaintiff in lieu of allowing the plaintiff to sue toties quoties.
The sections that follow explore these rules and discuss the extent to
which some or all of them can be incorporated into the copyright and patent
statutes.
A. The Default Bar Against Future Damages
The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Fay v.
Guynon 298 describes the default common-law rule:
If the damages subsequent to the date of the writ are merely incidental to
the cause of action declared on, such damages are to be assessed if they
are sustained up to the time of the verdict, and even in some cases
indefinitely beyond; but if the damages sustained after the date of the writ
are such as are not merely incidental to and growing out of the cause of
action, but may be the damages arising
from a new breach or a new cause
299
of action, they cannot be so assessed.
Judge J. G. Sutherland summarized in his treatise on American damages
30 0
law that these two rules were "recognized by all the [state-law] cases."
298. 131 Mass. 31 (1881).
299. Id. at 35.
300. 4 J. G. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 1039, at 3852 (John R.
Berryman ed., 4th ed. 1916); e.g., S. & N. Ala. R.R. Co. v. McLendon, 63 Ala. 266, 272
(1879); St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Biggs, 12 S.W. 331, 331 (Ark. 1889); Denver City
Irrigation & Water Co. v. Middaugh, 21 P. 565, 568-69 (Colo. 1889); McGann v. Hamilton,
19 A. 376, 377 (Conn. 1889); Cooper v. Sillers, 30 App. D.C. 567, 571-72 (1908); Farley v.
Gate City Gaslight Co., 31 S.E. 193, 195-99 (Ga. 1898); McConnel v. Kibbe, 29 I11.
483,
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The rules are not mutually exclusive. A defendant's continuing conduct
in the
can produce a hybrid of recoveries, some of which may be recovered
30 1
same suit and others which must be sought in a separate suit.
The Supreme Court has recognized these rules as a matter of federal law
in several antitrust cases. In Lawlor v. Loewe, 302 for example, the Court
approved a jury instruction that stated a plaintiff could not recover at trial
for injuries that had occurred subsequent to suit from new conspiratorial
acts. 30 3 And in 1971, the Court acknowledged that an antitrust conspiracy
constitutes a mixed tort capable of both continuing losses stemming from30 a4
particular past violation and losses stemming from future violations.
Whereas recovery for the former could be had at common law, recovery for
30 5
the latter could not.

These default rules port over easily to copyright and patent cases.
Like antitrust violations, copyright and patent infringements are capable
of creating postjudgment losses stemming from a discrete act of
prejudgment infringement. This type of loss is not subject to the bar against
future damages because it is akin to anticipated losses caused by a particular
event. One can think of each act of infringement as its own stand-alone
single-recovery tort. So long as a plaintiff can prove that her postjudgment
losses are attributable to a particular prejudgment infringement, there is no
be read into the
bar to relief. This explains why category (3) awards can
30 6
copyright and patent statutes as a matter of common law.
The prospective relief that courts typically order in lieu of a final
injunction differs, however, because it seeks to compensate plaintiffs for
postjudgment losses stemming from postjudgment infringements. This type
485-86 (1863); Shively v. Cedar Rapids, I.F. & N. Ry. Co., 37 N.W. 133, 134 (Iowa 1888);
Cumberland & Oxford Canal Corp. v. Hitchings, 65 Me. 140, 141-42 (1876); Lamm v. Chi.,
St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 47 N.W. 455, 459 (Minn. 1890); Gulf& C. Ry. Co. v. Hartley, 41
So. 382, 382 (Miss. 1906); Pinney v. Berry, 61 Mo. 359, 367-68 (1875); P. Ballantine &
Sons v. Pub. Serv. Corp. of N.J., 91 A. 95, 97-98 (N.J. 1914); Filer v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co.,
49 N.Y. 42, 44-45 (1872); Burnett v. Nicholson, 86 N.C. 112, 114-15 (1882); Thayer v.
Brooks, 17 Ohio 489, 493-94 (1848); Bare v. Hoffman, 79 Pa. 71, 77-78 (1875); Harman v.
Louisville, N.O. & T.R. Co., 11 S.W. 703, 704-05 (Tenn. 1889); Adm'r of Benjamin
Whitney v. Town of Clarendon, 18 Vt. 252, 255-56 (1846); McHenry v. City of
Parkersburg, 66 S.E. 750, 750-52 (W. Va. 1909); Cobb. v. Smith, 38 Wis. 21, 35-37 (1875);
see also I THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES §§ 88-93, at
150-58 (9th ed. 1912).
301. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 13, at 50 (1935).

302. 235 U.S. 522 (1915).
303. Id. at 536, affg Lawlor v. Loewe, 209 F. 721, 729 (2d Cir. 1913).
304. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 342-43 (1971).
305. Id. at 338-39; accord Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,
502 n.15 (1968); Wilcox v. Plummer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172, 182 (1830); see, e.g., Poster
Exch., Inc. v. Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 129, 131 n.4 (5th Cir. 1975); Fontana
Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080, 1087 (7th Cir. 1970); Dean Foods Co.
v. Albrecht Dairy Co., 396 F.2d 652, 661 (8th Cir. 1968); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d
368, 394 (9th Cir. 1957); Conn. Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, 101 F.2d 79, 81 (2d
Cir. 1939); Momand v. Universal Film Exch., 43 F. Supp. 996, 1006 (D. Mass. 1942); Frey
& Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 243 F. 205, 205-06 (D. Md. 1917).
306. See supra notes 101, 112 and accompanying text.
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of loss falls squarely within the default rule barring future damages for
continuing torts because each infringement constitutes a separate wrong
furnishing a ground for an independent cause of action.
Federal courts have recognized that patent and copyright infringements
often constitute continuing torts. Courts most commonly label infringement
a continuing tort when the question is whether the limitations period has
expired under the copyright 30 7 or patent statutes. 30 8 But the Federal Circuit
has also treated patent infringement as a continuing tort for purposes of
claim preclusion. 30 9 Both of these areas obviously share an affinity with
the issue of future damages. Additionally, the Federal Circuit has stated an
infringement that begins innocently can subsequently become willful
3 10
because "patent infringement is a continuing tort."
A Supreme Court decision from 1865 also supports a bar on damages for
future infringements, albeit without labeling infringement a continuing tort.
In Suffolk Co. v. Hayden,31 I the plaintiff sued for infringement of a patent
for cotton cleaners. The trial court instructed the jury that if they found
infringement, the only damages available were those incurred before the
action; all other infringements could only be recovered in "another suit by
the plaintiff. '3 12 The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that "the jury, in
ascertaining the damages upon this evidence, is not to estimate them for the
whole term of the patent, but only for the period of the infringement [up to
the action]. '3 13 Following this line of thinking, a number of other courts in
patent cases have since reached a similar (and correct) outcome by not
3 14
awarding a plaintiff monies for infringements that have yet to occur.
Also interesting is the way the Court of Federal Claims has treated
petitions brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which governs claims of patent
and copyright infringement against the United States and its contractors.
That section provides that no injunction is permitted and that instead a
plaintiff is to receive from the government "his reasonable and entire
307. See, e.g., Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir. 1992); Baxter v. Curtis
Indus., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 100, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F.
Supp. 1013, 1018 (S.D. Cal. 1942).

308. See, e.g., Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 1999); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1031
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
309. Young Eng'rs, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir.
1983); accord Williams v. Gillette Co., 887 F. Supp. 181, 183-85 (N.D. Il1. 1995) (holding

second patent action based on infringements subsequent to the judgment in the first action
not barred by claim preclusion); cf Mars Inc. v. Nippon Conlux Kabushiki-Kaisha, 58 F.3d
616, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (barring second action based on the very same acts of infringement

raised in the first action).
310. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
311. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 315 (1865).
312. Hayden v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 11 F. Cas. 900, 907 (C.C.D. Mass. 1862) (No. 6261).

313. Suffolk, 70 U.S. at 320.
314. See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2000); TruePosition, Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500, 525 (D. Del. 2008); Giese
v. Pierce Chem. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 98, 109-10 (D. Mass. 1999); Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst
Research Corp., 547 F. Supp. 401, 416 (D. Minn. 1982).
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compensation" as damages for the infringement. 3 15 Because the Court of
Claims treats the government's conduct as a form of eminent domain
subject to just compensation, 316 and the statute calls for reasonable and
entire compensation, one would have thought the award could include
compensation for infringements anticipated to occur after judgment. The
cases seemingly state the contrary, however. 317 Though they allow
recovery for infringements occurring after the filing of the petition in the
court, the cases have suggested they would not allow recovery for
318
infringements occurring after final judgment.
So how is it that some federal courts have seen fit to order a money
award in patent and copyright cases to compensate for future, postjudgment
infringements? In many cases, probably because the parties did not object.
In most others, it was probably by relying on wrongly decided (albeit
sometimes binding) copyright and patent precedents, a matter I will return
to in Part VII.C. But apart from that, it seems accidental. Courts may
assume that prospective compensation is entirely permissible given that
claims for future damages are not only commonly sought, but commonly
awarded, in a wide variety of tort cases. Indeed, one judge recently
analogized the task of awarding future damages in a patent case to other
torts where, as he noted, jurors are "asked to calculate loss of future earning
capacity, future medical expenses, future pain and suffering, or future lost
profits. '3 19 The problem, of course, is that the analogy is a faulty one. The
judge amalgamated single-wrong torts and continuing torts.
The default rule against future damages for continuing wrongs has two
exceptions. The first can be treated quickly here. Many states now agree
that courts may award damages incurred between the filing of the action
through the time of the trial (and perhaps judgment) regardless of whether
the harm involved stems from a continuing wrong. 320 The rule in federal
315. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)-(b) (2006).
316. See Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1167 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
317. See Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 967 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (holding that
the word "entire" was added to the statute in 1918 to emphasize that the statutory remedy
against the United States was the only remedy permitted and to overrule a prior case where
the Supreme Court had allowed a patentee to sue and enjoin a government contractor).
318. See, e.g., De Graffenried v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 780, 784 (1981) ("[R]elief for
future infringements is beyond the power of the court by declaratory judgment or
otherwise."); Ushakoff v. United States, 375 F.2d 822, 824 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("[Petitioner was
entitled to an accounting for any Gove[r]nment use or manufacture that occurs between the
filing date of the original petition and the expiration of the patent or the entry of final
judgment, whichever occurs first." (citing Calhoun v. United States, 354 F.2d 337, 340 (Ct.
Cl. 1965))); Irving Air Chute Co., Inc. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 633, 637 (Ct. Cl. 1950)
("We think that if one suit must suffice for all uses by the Government, past and prospective,
it would be impossible to determine what compensation would be reasonable or
entire ... ").
319. Ariba, Inc. v. Emptoris, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 914, 918 (E.D. Tex. 2008).
320. E.g., Renz v. 33rd Dist. Agric. Ass'n, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 67, 69-71 (Ct. App. 1996)
(citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 3283 (West 1997)); Hawley v. Mowatt, 160 P.3d 421, 425 (Colo.
App. 2007); Krejci v. Capriotti, 305 N.E.2d 667, 669-70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Seaboard Oil
Co. v. Britt, 271 S.W. 1038, 1039 (Ky. 1925); Schrunk v. Andres, 22 N.W.2d 548, 552-53
(Minn. 1946); Winchester v. Byers, 145 S.E. 774, 775 (N.C. 1928); Pantall v. Rochester &
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court is essentially the same under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
That rule permits parties to amend their complaints, expressly or implicitly,
to conform to the evidence at trial and to file supplemental pleadings during
322
the case. 32 1 These rules were originally borrowed from equity practice.
Because these rules are transsubstantive, courts can, if requested, permit
3 23
recovery for wrongs in copyright and patent actions through judgment.
B. PropertyLaw-Permanent Wrongs
A more important exception-developed in part at law and in part in
equity in cases involving invasions of land or its enjoyment-also affects
continuing wrongs. In limited cases, courts hold that a continuing trespass
or nuisance must instead be labeled and considered "permanent." The
effects of this transformation are usually threefold. First, the claim accrues
once and for all under a statute of limitations when the initial trespass or
wrong occurs or is discovered. This differs from the traditional rule that a
new period of limitations runs for each day the trespass or nuisance is
ongoing. Second, and most relevant for our purposes, a plaintiff is then
permitted to recover future damages for the "permanent" wrong. The award
thus changes from temporary damages-such as the rental value of the
encroachment-to compensation for the change in market value of the
property. And third, as a consequence of the availability of prospective
compensation for future harms, claim preclusion would now bar any
324
subsequent actions based on the continuation of the conduct.
The question thus becomes whether the permanency exception for real
property can be incorporated into the copyright and patent statutes and, if
so, in what manner. Can a court declare that a defendant's infringement is
expected to continue indefinitely into the future, that the harm is
"permanent," and that the plaintiff must therefore recover for all future
infringements in one action (rather than be allowed to bring subsequent
actions as the infringements accrue)? Melville Nimmer suggested in 1974,
and David Nimmer continues to suggest today, that the exception can

P. Coal & Iron Co., 53 A. 751, 751-52 (Pa. 1902) (citing 12 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1557 (West
1876)); Comminge v. Stevenson, 13 S.W. 556, 558 (Tex. 1890); Woldson v. Woodhead, 149
P.3d 361, 364-66 (Wash. 2006).

321. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b), (d).
322. See Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788, 800-01 (1869);
MCCORMICK, supra note 301, § 13, at 47, 51-52.
323. E.g., Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Parker v. Brown & Root, 198 F. Supp. 795, 801 (S.D. Tex. 1961); Solex Labs., Inc. v.
Graham, 165 F. Supp. 428, 438 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Otis Elevator Co. v. 570 Bldg. Corp., 35 F.
Supp. 348, 348-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); see also Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus, Inc.,
609 F. Supp. 2d 951, 960-61 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (not relying on Rule 15 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure); Calhoun v. United States, 354 F.2d 337, 339-40 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (same).
324. The rules described below relate to compensation at common law. Statutes or
constitutional provisions requiring just compensation for takings of property differ of course.
E.g., Mason City & Ft. D.R. Co. v. Kennedy, 192 F. 538, 539-40 (8th Cir. 1911); Grafton v.
B. & OR. Co., 21 F. 309, 310-11 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1884).
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conceivably apply in this manner, at least with respect to copyright cases. 325
But their suggestions were made in passing and do not withstand scrutiny.
1. State Common Law
The development of the permanency exception has arisen most often in
the context of a statute-of-limitations defense or claim preclusion, but the
first case in the United States to articulate the exception involved the
availability of future damages. Charles McCormick traces the origin of the
exception, commonly known as the "permanent trespass" doctrine, to a
decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In Town of Troy v.
Cheshire Rail Road Co., 32 6 the Town of Troy brought an action at law
against a railroad company that had laid tracks upon highways and bridges,
thereby making them unusable by nonrail conveyances. The defendant
sought to limit the plaintiff's recovery to harms incurred before the filing of
the writ. Though the court agreed with the general bar on postwrit
damages, it carved out an exception in the case:
Wherever the nuisance is of... a permanent character, that will continue
without change from any cause but human labor, there, the damage is an
original damage, and may be at once fully compensated ....
But where the continuance of such act is [not] . . . necessarily of a
permanent character, but may, or may not be . . . continued, there the

injury, to 32be
compensated in a suit, is only the damage that has
7
happened.
Finding that the railroad was "in its nature[,] design, and use, a permanent
structure, which cannot be assumed to be liable to change," the court ruled
328
that the future harm to the town was "dependent upon no contingency."
329
The town was permitted to "recover at once their reasonable damages."
Because the plaintiff had not sought equitable relief, the first appearance of
this remedy in the United States was at law, rather than in equity.
The permanency exception was limited initially to cases where no
affirmative acts were required to maintain the trespass. Thus, if the
intrusion would continue without further actions by the defendant-as in

325. See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 157.2, at 700 (1976)

("[W]here great public injury would be worked by [a final] injunction, the courts might
follow cases in other areas of property law, and award damages or a continuing royalty
instead of an injunction in such special circumstances." (citing Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit
Ass'n, 209 U.S. 20 (1908); West Publ'g Co. v. Lawyers Coop. Publ'g Co., 79 F. 756 (2d Cir.
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 14.06[B][1][b][ii], at 14-159 to 14-160 (2009) (standing for a similar proposition).
Notably, the Nimmers would limit use of the doctrine to cases where granting an injunction
would work an injury to the public. Id.
326. 23 N.H. 83 (1851), cited by MCCORMICK, supra note 301, § 127, at 505.
327. Id. at 102.
328. Id. at 103-04.
329. Id. at 104.
1897)));
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Town of Troy--courts might label the tort permanent. 330 But if additional
acts were required for the wrong to persist, then the trespass remained
temporary and continuing. 33 1 McCormick notes, however, that "the
doctrine was [then] extended to situations where the nuisance... flow[ed]
from the defendant's active operation of some factory, plant, or
establishment. '332 The question arose: Under what circumstances should
affirmative, ongoing acts nevertheless be deemed "permanent"?
The most common and traditional answer has been where the defendant
is acting in a public or semipublic capacity and its conduct could have
formed the basis for condemnation proceedings against the plaintiffs
property (had that route been taken). 333 Later, courts went further and
broadened the exception to affirmative conduct done in a wholly private
capacity, so long as that conduct was done for the public welfare. 334 Thus,
in most cases where a court deemed affirmative acts "permanent," the court
was holding not only that the invasion would likely continue but that it
"should continue indefinitely" 335 because the public at large somehow
significantly benefited from the defendant's conduct.
Any attempt to reconcile the cases beyond these contours is all but
impossible. The case law is diverse and often cannot be harmonized even
within the same jurisdiction. 336 These difficulties have led some courts to
follow the lead of the Restatement of Torts and permit plaintiffs in close
cases-i.e., where the permanency of the wrong is debatable--to treat the
defendant's wrong as either continuing or permanent and thereby choose to
seek past damages in successive actions as they accrue or all of their
damages, past and future, in a single action. 337 Charles McCormick
330. WILLIAM B. HALE & ROGER W. COOLEY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 12425 (2d ed. 1912). This was not universally recognized. Some courts have held that a
trespass remains temporary if the defendant can actually or (in some jurisdictions)
reasonably undo what she has already done. The fact the trespass will persist without further
action is not dispositive. E.g., Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 912 P.2d 1220, 1229-30 (Cal.
1996); Kentland-Elkhom Coal Co. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Ky. 1974); Dietzel v.
City of New York, 112 N.E. 720, 720 (N.Y. 1916); Fradkin v. Northshore Util. Dist., 977
P.2d 1265, 1269-70 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); see also 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 300, § 93.
331. HALE & COOLEY, supra note 330, at 124-25.
332. MCCORMICK, supra note 301, § 127, at 506 (emphasis added).
333. Accord id. at 506-07; 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 300, § 95.
334. E.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. W.J. & M.S. Vesey, 200 N.E. 620, 626 (Ind. 1936);
Milan v. City of Bethlehem, 94 A.2d 774, 776-77 (Pa. 1953); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 930(2) & cmt. c (1979); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 930(1)(b)(i)
& cmt. b (1939).
335. Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 219 (Colo. 2003) (emphasis added).
336. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 57, at 116 (2000) ("It is not easy to find
harmony in the case results."); I FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON
TORTS § 1.7, at 34 (3d ed. 2006) ("[T]he tests of distinction are clouded by doubt and
confusion .... "); HALE & COOLEY, supra note 330, at 121 ("It is impossible to reconcile all
of the cases."); 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 300, § 94 ("Courts of the highest authority have
differed on the question."). See generally Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d
264, 281-90 (Tex. 2004) (recounting the split of authorities within Texas).
337. See Beatty v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 860 F.2d 1117, 1125 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (District of Columbia law); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Wand, 308 F.2d 504, 507-08 (9th
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managed to include this approach in the Restatement of Torts in his capacity
as an advisor.3 38 Importantly, the choice to seek prospective compensation
is the plaintiff s, and courts ordinarily cannot force a plaintiff to accept that
type of award if she would prefer to pursue successive actions. The sole
exception recognized by the Restatement is where the defendant is engaged
'339
in an "essential public service.
One more point bears mentioning. Though the foregoing lump-sum,
future-damages award first appeared in the United States as a legal remedy,
that characterization is often inappropriate. With some exceptions, most
cases addressing whether to award a plaintiff damages for future wrongs
have been brought in equity, rather than at law. This follows because most
suits involving continuing torts seek injunctive relief, and the issue of
whether to grant future damages arises when the court has declined to grant
a final injunction. 340 The remedy is thus given in lieu of a final injunction,
much as Lord Cairns' Act allowed in England in 1858. Indeed, in many
land cases, courts have ordered lump-sum, future damages with the proviso
that if the defendant does not pay the judgment, the injunction will issue. 34 1
Though it has been said that monetary relief should presumptively be
thought of as a "legal" remedy, 342 the history of prospective compensation
for postjudgment, continuing wrongs in England and the United States
rebuts any such presumption here. At best, courts can characterize a lumpsum prospective award as legal only if the plaintiff seeks the award from
the outset and never requests an injunction. 34 3 It is therefore more correct,
and not surprisingly most consistent with the English approach, to label
lump-sum awards in lieu of a final injunction as an equitable remedy.
The argument for characterizing continuing royalties in lieu of an
injunction as equitable is even stronger. Apart from the history, which
Cir. 1962) (Oregon law); Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011-13 (D.
Colo. 2004) (Colorado law); Shults v. Champion Int'l Corp., 821 F. Supp. 517, 519 (E.D.
Tenn. 1992) (North Carolina law); Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 628-29 (Cal.
1952); Cox v. Cambridge Square Towne Houses, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 73, 74-75 (Ga. 1977). But
see Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 281-82 (refusing to allow a plaintiff to elect temporary or
permanent damages); DOBBS, supra note 336, § 57, at 118-19 (criticizing the election
principle); see also Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 912 P.2d 1220, 1230 (Cal. 1996)
(reserving whether to revisit the election right).
338. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 930(1)(b) (1939); MCCORMICK, supra note
301, § 127, at 511-15; Charles T. McCormick, Damagesfor AnticipatedInjury to Land, 37
HARv. L. REv. 574, 596-97 (1924); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 930(1), (2)
(1979).
339. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 930(2) cmt. c, 944 cmt. h (1979).
340. See id. § 951 & cmt. a.
341. E.g., McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951,954-55 (C.C.D. Utah
1904); Baldwin v. McClendon, 288 So. 2d 761, 766 (Ala. 1974); Boomer v. Atd. Cement
Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970). For a case recognizing as much outside the realproperty context, see Enplanar, Inc. v. Marsh, 11 F.3d 1284, 1290 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994). The
court held that there could be no award of money damages in lieu of an injunction.
342. See Felmer v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352 (1998).
343. Accord Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570-71 (1990); Mitchell
v. Vill. of White Plains, 36 N.Y.S. 935, 936-37 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1895).
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shows that no such remedy existed at common law in England or the United
States, and could only conceivably be awarded in equity starting in 1858,
their contingent nature counsels for labeling them as equitable. All money
awards at common law must be made in a single, lump-sum judgment.
Periodic or contingent awards are not permitted. 344 It should thus come as
granting contingent awards in
no surprise that the few American cases
34 5
property cases were decided in equity.
So can the permanency exception be incorporated into the copyright or
patent statutes? The Grupo line of cases tells us no. Prospective
compensation is an equitable remedy, and state law therefore has no say in
determining its default availability in federal courts. This means not only
that the law of the forum state is irrelevant, but that the general law of
equity as it exists in the various states is as well. As the Supreme Court has
stated, even though "a State may authorize its courts to give equitable relief
unhampered by" the historical restrictions on equitable remedies, state-law
346
cases cannot remove those historical "fetters from the federal courts."
Even if one can consider state decisional law, the confused state of the
law at the time of the patent and copyright statutes in 1952 and 1976 would
make incorporation of the permanency exception difficult to justify. As
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has explained, "when a significant split in
authority exist[s], it strains credulity to argue that Congress simply assumed
that one view rather than the other would govern. ' 34 7 If no common themes
can be discerned from case law applying the permanency exception, then
we cannot incorporate it, and only the default common-law bar on future
damages for continuing infringements remains. Additionally, can we really
have expected Congress to have mastered this difficult area of nuisance and
trespass law in preparation for enacting a patent or copyright statute?
Insofar as some themes can be found in the cases, those trends counsel
against using the permanency exception in most infringement cases.
As I have already noted, the exception applies in its most traditional form
if the wrong would continue without any affirmative acts on the part of the
defendant or its agents. Unlike continuing trespasses-which can be (and
often are) committed by failures to undo something once it has already been
done-patent and copyright infringement are typically committed by
continuing affirmative acts. In the prototypical case, the defendant
practices the plaintiffs invention or prints or sells the plaintiffs book into
the foreseeable future. Additionally, the early trespass cases dealt almost
exclusively with actual physical structures. Though one can, of course,
infringe a copyright by constructing a structure protected by architectural
344. See Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 128 (1904); United States v.
Bauman, 56 F. Supp. 109, 117 (D. Or. 1943).
345. See, e.g., Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Ref. Co., 276 F. 932, 948 (D.
Wyo. 1922), affd, 294 F. 597, 609 (8th Cir. 1923); Quality Excelsior Coal Co. v. Reeves,
177 S.W.2d 728, 734-35 (Ark. 1944).
346. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105-06 (1945).
347. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 93 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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plans or as an architectural work, that infringement obviously requires
affirmative acts and in some cases is continued
by other affirmative acts,
348
such as the leasing or selling of the structure.
Labeling an infringement permanent, for purposes of future damages,
could also have unintended consequences on limitation periods. At present,
the copyright and patent statutes provide for rolling limitation periods that
begin to run from the date of each discrete infringement. 3 49 But if an
infringement is labeled permanent, then many of the property cases have
held that the plaintiff must sue for all damages-from past and future
infringements-once and for all within a certain number of years after the
first original wrong. The claim for entire damages accrues at once. Thus,
after three years of "permanent" copyright infringements, or six years in the
case of patents, the plaintiff would be unable to recover at all. Each new
infringement would not form the basis for a new cause of action. A
plaintiff who misidentified an infringement as temporary, rather than
permanent, would thus run the terrible risk of being completely barred even
where the infringement was ongoing at the time of trial. To suggest that
Congress contemplated such a rule, of course, is absurd. Query whether
courts should be allowed to selectively incorporate some common laws into
350
a statute but not others.
The Restatement of Torts approach would also not support imposing
prospective compensation in lieu of a final injunction on plaintiffs in most
intellectual-property cases. The fact that a court has denied an injunction
because it would not be in the public interest does not necessarily empower
that same court to force a compulsory license on the plaintiff. That avenue
would only be available if the defendant's conduct constituted an "essential
public service." 35 1 And those cases are typically limited to inversecondemnation analogs. In cases not involving an essential public service,
which will constitute the majority of the cases, the Restatement provides
that it is the plaintiff who elects in close cases whether to seek permanent
damages or to pursue successive actions. The court cannot force a plaintiff
to take prospective compensation in lieu of a final injunction. The only
party who would have no say in the matter is the adjudged infringer.

348. E.g., Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543-44 (4th Cir.
2007).
349. See 17 U.S.C. § 507 (2006) (three-year limitation); 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2006) (six-year
limitation).
350. Similar difficulties have led some courts in property cases to consider decoupling the
consequences of the "permanent" labeling, such that a tort might be labeled permanent for
purposes of allowing future damages, but not for purposes of the limitations period. E.g.,
Beatty v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 860 F.2d 1117, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Cook v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011-13 (D. Colo. 2004); see also Mangini v.
Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 912 P.2d 1220, 1230 (Cal. 1996) (reserving whether to decouple for
another day). The Restatement approach appears to approve decoupling.
351. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 930(2) cmt. c, 944 cmt. h (1979).
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2. Federal Common Law
The Supreme Court has decided two land cases that require special
attention because they have been cited by a handful of copyright and patent
3 52
decisions as possible authorities for granting prospective compensation.
The first is New York City v. Pine,353 which involved a nearly completed
dam. The dam diverted water away from the plaintiffs land to increase the
water supply to New York City. The trial court enjoined the city from
diverting the water and held in the alternative that the court had no power in
equity to ascertain and order the payment of future damages in lieu
thereof.3 54 The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the plaintiff's delay
in filing suit, and the public convenience associated with the defendant's
conduct, called for only a conditional injunction. The Court stated that the
trial court should ascertain in equity the damages the plaintiff would suffer
in the future from the dam and then order the defendant to pay the
ascertained sum by a certain date or suffer the injunction previously entered
by the trial court. 3 55 Notably, in reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected
an argument that any power in equity to award future damages would have
356
required legislation similar to Lord Cairns' Act.
Pine does not support the current practice in patent and copyright cases
of forcing plaintiffs to take prospective compensation in lieu of a final
injunction. For one, the decision seems to leave the plaintiff the option of
pursuing the defendant at law with successive actions. The Supreme Court
stated that if "the plaintiffs shall prefer to have their damages assessed by a
jury, leave may be given to dismiss the bill without prejudice to an action at
law." 357 Moreover, insofar as Pine held that the trial court could award
future damages in equity for a continuing tort, the case has been fatally
undermined by Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond
Fund, Inc.358 In the absence of legislation, the default equitable powers in
federal court depend on Chancery practice in 1789. The passage of Lord
Cairns' Act and the cases I have already discussed demonstrate that no such
power existed at law or in equity in England until 1858.
The second case is Harrisonville v. W S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing
359
Co.,
which some commentators have cited as authority for granting
prospective relief regardless of whether a tort is deemed "permanent" or
not. There, a city's sewage disposal plant had regularly discharged
352. Judges Arthur Gajarsa and Pauline Newman of the Federal Circuit have also cited
these cases in support of awarding enhanced damages in lieu of a final injunction. See In re
Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Gajarsa, J., joined by Newman,
J., concurring).
353. 185 U.S. 93 (1902).
354. Id. at 95.

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id. at 108.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 108.
See supra text accompanying notes 179-89.
289 U.S. 334, 339-41 (1933).
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pollution into a creek since 1923. The plaintiffs farm was seriously
affected, and after five years the plaintiff sued for nuisance in federal court.
Jurisdiction was "based solely on diversity of citizenship," 360 and the lower
court granted a final injunction. The issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the injunction should have issued and, if not, what remedy to order
instead. The city insisted the nuisance was permanent, as that term was
understood under Missouri law, and that the plaintiffs claim had therefore
accrued in 11923 and was barred under the applicable statute of
36
limitations.
The Court held that an injunction could not issue because the city's
sewage plant engaged in a public service. But more importantly, the Court
allowed an award of future damages in lieu of the injunction and held that
whether the nuisance was "permanent" or not was irrelevant for
determining whether a federal court could allow future damages. 362 This
flew in the face of Missouri law, which stated that if a plaintiff was
permitted to recover future damages, the nuisance was permanent. The
statute would have begun to run once and for all in 1923, and the claim
would have been barred. 363 The Court, acting under its pre-Erie powers,
openly ignored Missouri law. "We have no occasion to determine the scope
of the doctrine of permanent nuisance as applied in Missouri; nor need we
consider to what extent the local law on that subject would be accepted as
' ' 364
controlling in the federal courts.
Harrisonville must be ignored for two reasons. First, insofar as it
purports to create a new equitable remedy it fails for the same reasons
already noted with Pine-the remedy was not available in equity in
Chancery circa 1789. Second, given the decision's pre-Erie basis, it seems
particularly unwise to rely upon Harrisonville when considering what
decisional law we can deem Congress to have incorporated into the
copyright and patent statutes. As Justice Hugo Black explained,
Indulging for the moment the convenient fiction that Congress knows
all about [a pre-Erie] rule and what it means, why should it think that old
Swift v. Tyson doctrine
rules laid down by this Court and based on the
could survive our decision in Erie v. Tompkins?365
It is not uncommon for courts (including the Supreme Court) to question
366
the precedential value of diversity cases decided before Erie.
Harrisonvilleshould be no exception.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 336.
Id. at 337, 340-41.
Id. at 339-41.
Id. at 341 (describing Missouri common law).
Id.
Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 465 (1948) (Black, J., joined by Murphy and

Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).

366. E.g., Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504 (1919), abrogation recognized by
Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 217-18 (1997); Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S.
215 (1918), abrogationrecognized by Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315,
318 (1st Cir. 1967).
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It also bears noting that neither Harrisonville nor Pine were decided in
the face of a federal statute that governed the behavior at issue. The Court
therefore did not need to worry about scuttling the views of Congress.

The preceding sections have demonstrated several things. First, a
damage award for postjudgment continuing infringements or wrongs was
never recognized at common law in England. Equity recognized a similar
award in certain cases, but that was not until 1858 and only by an act of
Parliament. Second, a damage award for postjudgment wrongs was also not
recognized at common law in the United States. Though an exception later
developed in the states for "permanent" wrongs, the exception cannot be
incorporated into the patent and copyright statutes because it amounts to an
equitable doctrine that was not recognized in the Court of Chancery in or
around 1789. Even if incorporated, the exception would make for a poor fit
in most copyright and patent cases.
C. Copyright and Patent Cases
In Part VII.A, I asked why federal courts believe they can impose
continuing royalties on litigants in lieu of a final injunction and I indicated
that the simplest answer was probably because U.S. precedent in copyright
and patent suits permit them to do so. Indeed, scholars and courts have
cited numerous early U.S. copyright and patent cases as support for
awarding a judicially imposed license in lieu of a final injunction. I have
already shown that those cases are irrelevant for determining the default
equitable remedies of federal courts. But even if they are instructive, the
cases are actually of no help. None of the cases appearing before the Patent
Act of 1952 say anything about continuing royalties, let alone that they may
be compulsory. And though one case in 1936 does speak of awarding a
lump-sum award in lieu of a final injunction, that case was an anomaly
intimately associated with the doctrine of patent exhaustion. Moreover, in
the years before the Copyright Act of 1976, two decisions did arise, but
they did not yet represent the "general state" of the common law.
Let us look at those decisions more closely.
1. Cases Decided Before 1952
Take, for example, the case of Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co. v.
Carborundum Co. ,367 which one commentator has interpreted as "issu[ing]
a compulsory license. '36 8 The plaintiff patented a process for smelting
ores, and the defendant patented an end-product called carborundum. The
defendant could only make carborundum by infringing the plaintiffs
367. 189 F. 710 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1900).
368. Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay
v. MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 37 (2009).
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process, and the plaintiff could not make carborundum without infringing
the defendant's patent. 369 The plaintiff sued, and in November 1900 the
trial court "granted" an injunction, but made it conditional because of the
blocking patents, the importance of carborundum, and the financial ruin the
defendant would suffer if the injunction issued.370 The court referred the
case to a master for an accounting of the defendant's profits and held that
"'no injunction w[ould] issue until the further order of this court if the
defendant ...file[d] a bond... to secure to the complainant the profits and

3 71
damages which [it] may ultimately be decreed to pay."'
The facts make clear, however, that the case provides no authority for
creating a compulsory license for postjudgment infringements. First,
because of the date the patent expired (in 1902) and the date the final decree
was entered (in 1911), the money award was backward looking. 372 This is
not a case of a court ordering a defendant to pay for infringements that will
occur after judgment. Moreover, nothing in the case suggests that retaining
the case in equity was done against the wishes of the plaintiff. The plaintiff
could very well have preferred this procedure over filing a new action at
law to obtain a backward-looking award of actual damages from a jury.
Consider also the case of Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass 'n. 373 The trial
court denied a final injunction because the defendant had taken only a
trifling amount. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that in "such cases
the copyright owner should be remitted to his remedy at law." 374 This must
be understood as requiring the plaintiff to file an action for infringements
after they arise. The Supreme Court's opinion affirming the order supports
this reading: "[W]e think the discretion of the court was wisely exercised in
refusing an injunction and remitting the appellants to a court of law to
recover such damage as they might there prove that they had sustained. '3 75
The same must be said of West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson
Co. 376 The trial court denied a final injunction because the plaintiff had

369. Elec. Smelting, 189 F. at 712.
370. Id. at 712-13. Several commentators have suggested the injunction was denied
because the plaintiff was a nonpracticing entity. See Brian D. Coggio et al., Damage
Control-What an Adjudged Infringer Can Do To Minimize the Resulting Damage, 15

AIPLA Q.J. 250, 254 (1987); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude:
Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187, 2219 n.148 (2000); Kurt M.
Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology
Suppression, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 389, 442 (2002); Venkatesan, supra note 368, at 37.
This is incorrect. The plaintiff actually used its patented process on metals. It even made
carborundum, albeit not on a commercial scale. See Elec. Smelting & Aluminum Co. v.
Carborundum Co., 102 F. 618, 633 (3d Cir. 1900).
371. Elec. Smelting, 189 F. at 714 (quoting Dorsey Harvester Revolving-Rake Co. v.
Marsh, 7 F. Cas. 939, 945-46 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1873) (No. 4014)).
372. Carborundum Co. v. Elec. Smelting & Aluminum Co., 203 F. 976, 977 (3d Cir.
1913).
373. 209 U.S. 20 (1908).
374. Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 144 F. 83, 85 (7th Cir. 1906).
375. Dun, 209 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
376. 176 F. 833 (2dCir. 1910).
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delayed suit for sixteen years and future infringement was unlikely. 377 The
court then refused to retain the case for an accounting of past profits and
ordered the plaintiff to bring an action at law. The Second Circuit affirmed
in part, but held the trial court could have retained the cause under its equity
cleanup jurisdiction to determine the "damages the complainant has
sustained. '378 On remand, the matter was referred to a master to determine
the damages the plaintiff suffered. The3 8parties
settled, 379 but it seems the
0
retrospective.
been
have
would
damages
Another commonly cited case is City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge,
Inc.381 The trial court permanently enjoined the City of Milwaukee from
operating a sewage plant because of patent infringement. The appellate
court reversed because the plaintiff had delayed in filing suit, and closing
the plant would be against the public interest. The court said little about
what alternative remedy, if any, would be appropriate, other than that "[t]he
'382
damages of appellee may be compensated by a money judgment.
383
Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation,
which some courts and scholars have also cited, says nothing about what
alternative relief may be appropriate when a final injunction is denied. At
most, the appellate court stated in obiter dictum that a trial court can deny a
final injunction to a patent holder when the defendant's use of the patented
process is necessary to ensure public health. In point of fact, the court had
384
held that the plaintiff's patents were invalid.
There is one case that granted a lump sum in lieu of a final injunction,
Curtiss Aerocar Co. v. Springer,385 but it seems to be an unprecedented
extension of patent exhaustion and was an anomaly not seen again. An
explanation of the exhaustion, or first-sale, doctrine helps place the case in
context. Exhaustion occurs when a patentee unconditionally sells or
authorizes the sale of a product that embodies the patented invention. The
purchaser is then permitted, for the useful life of the item, to use it or sell it
to another person even though use and further sale technically constitute
prima facie infringement of the patented component. 386 This implied-in377. West Publ'g Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 864, 884-85 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.
1909).
378. West Publ'g, 176 F. at 839.
379. West Publ'g. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 184 F. 749, 751 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1911).
380. See also Nemey v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 83 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1936); Am.
Safety Device Co. v. Kurland Chem. Co., 68 F.2d 734, 734-35 (2d Cir. 1934); Blackburn v.
S. Cal. Gas Co., 14 F. Supp. 553, 554 (S.D. Cal. 1936); Ballard v. Pittsburgh, 12 F. 783, 786
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1882); McCrary v. Pa. Canal Co., 5 F. 367, 368 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1880), affd,
141 U.S. 459 (1891).
381. 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934).
382. Id. at 593. The court's use of "judgment" instead of "decree" in this pre-1938
merger case indicates that the court had a judgment at law, rather than a decree in equity, in
mind.
383. 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1944).
384. Id. at 946-47, 956.
385. 81 F.2d 668, 669 (5th Cir. 1936).
386. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873); Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 544, 547 (1872).
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law license lasts as long as the particular item does-not necessarily as long
as the patent term-and does not permit later manufacture.
In the late 19th century, courts extended this doctrine to cases where the
initial manufacture or sale of the patented product was unauthorized. If the
patentee had obtained and collected a more-than-nominal patentinfringement judgment against the entity that placed the infringing products
into the stream of commerce, the patentee would not be allowed to sue and
enjoin any downstream consumers for using the patent-embodying
products. 387 The basis for extending exhaustion was that once the patentee
had obtained full compensation in the suit against the manufacturer, the
patentee had effectively adopted the manufacturer's infringing sales as if
they had been the patentee's own. 388 A few courts then extended this
doctrine to protect a downstream user where the patentee had not yet
collected a judgment against the initial manufacturer, so long as the
patentee had successfully sued the manufacturer and it appeared the
manufacturer would be able to pay the judgment (e.g., by posting a
389
bond).
It was in this context that the Fifth Circuit decided Curtiss. There, the
patentee held a design patent for a trailer vehicle and sued another
manufacturer for infringement.
The patentee obtained a decree of
infringement and a permanent injunction, but no award of damages or
profits. 390 While the case was on appeal, a consumer purchased a trailer
vehicle from the accused manufacturer on the assurance that the
manufacturer had the right to sell it. The patentee then sued the consumer
on the ground that his use of the manufacturer's vehicle constituted
infringement. The trial judge granted an injunction against the user but
carved out an exception that permitted continued use of the vehicle
throughout its reasonable life, "restraining the defendant as to it only from
391
making major repairs substantially amounting to a reconstruction."
The Fifth Circuit reversed. Noting that the patentee had not been
compensated, the court held that a fuller injunction against the consumer
prohibiting use of the trailer would have to issue. 392 But the court then
stated that the consumer could avoid the injunction if he paid a lump sum
sufficient to compensate the patentee for use of the design embodied in the
vehicle. 393 Cognizant, perhaps, of the desire to protect downstream
customers, the court effectively allowed the consumer to pay where the
infringing manufacturer had not. This extension is understandable insofar
as the court recognized (as it must have) that pricing damages on a single
item would be relatively easy. It also seems likely, given the defendant,
387. Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485, 488-89 (1884) (dictum).
388. See Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 113-14 (1922).
389. Allis v. Stowell, 16 F. 783, 787-88 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1883); Gilbert & Barker Mfg.
Co. v. Bussing, 10 F. Cas. 348, 349 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 5416).

390. Harris & Schafer, Inc. v. Curtiss Aerocar Co., 69 F.2d 264, 264 (5th Cir. 1934).
391. Curtiss Aerocar Co. v. Springer, 81 F.2d 668, 669 (5th Cir. 1936).
392. Id.

393. Id. at 670.
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that the plaintiff did not object. In any event, the decision was novel and
effectively dead on arrival. With one inapposite exception, Curtiss has
never been cited in a reported case in the last seventy-four years.
In light of the foregoing, it is impossible to argue that Congress
contemplated and incorporated a judicially imposed compulsory license
into the Patent Act of 1952, whether it be in the form of a continuing
royalty or a lump-sum award. When one reads the cases with the gloss of
the common law, which should now be fresh in the reader's mind, the
context and limited scope of the cases become clear.
2. Cases Decided Between 1952 and 1976
Two circuit court cases decided before the Copyright Act of 1976 could
conceivably have influenced congressional intent in passing that Act,
though whether to label them as a common-law trend suitable for
incorporation seems incredibly doubtful. Both decisions are patentinfringement suits decided by the Second Circuit in 1961 and 1974.
Though the first states its approval of a continuing royalty, it actually does
less than what others have imagined. The second unequivocally adopts a
continuing royalty in lieu of a final injunction.
In Royal-McBee Corp. v. Smith-Corona Marchant,Inc., 394 the plaintiff
held a patent for an automatic margin regulator for typewriters. The
plaintiff sued two defendants in separate cases in March 1947, one of which
involved the defendant in suit Smith-Corona. The trial court entered
interlocutory orders on October 3, 1947, declaring both defendants had
infringed the patent. 395 The court later entered a permanent injunction
against one defendant, 396 but not against Smith-Corona because the plaintiff
had suggested in a 1940 letter to Smith-Corona that its typewriters no
longer infringed. 397 The denial of the injunction was contingent on the
defendant paying a "fair royalty" of $1.09 on each infringing typewriter
from the date of the suit until the expiration of the patent in 1950.398 There
seems to be little doubt that this constituted a continuing royalty. SmithCorona did not appeal the unpublished decision and the case was instead
held in abeyance while the other defendant's case was heard on appeal.
The Second Circuit affirmed the companion case in May 1948, 399 and
400
that case terminated in the Supreme Court in November of the same year.
Smith-Corona then continued to litigate its case before the district court,
394. 295 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961).
395. For the order in the companion case, see Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand,
Inc., 76 F. Supp. 220 (D. Conn. 1947).
396. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 734, 734 (D. Conn.
1948).
397. Royal-McBee, 295 F.2d at 4-6.
398. Id. at 2-3. The trial court barred the plaintiff from seeking damages prior to suit
because of laches. Id. at 5.
399. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1948).
400. Remington Rand, Inc. v. Royal Typewriter Co., 335 U.S. 864 (1948).
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attempting in 1951 to amend its counterclaims in an effort to invalidate the
patent. 40 1 After that attempt failed, the parties attempted to settle but the
negotiations broke down.
Smith-Corona finally submitted to an
"accounting" before a master long after the patent had already expired in
1950. Indeed, the Second Circuit itself noted that the appeal from the final
judgment occurred "more than ten years after the patent expired. '40 2 The
order on appeal, therefore, turned out to be nothing more than a standard
case, with the master simply assessing a reasonable royalty up through the
time of his hearing of the matter. Though the district court's decision,
initially, was forward looking, the order that became final for appeal and
that the Second Circuit reviewed was solely backward looking. Thus, the
Second Circuit's statement that it approved the district court's "flexible
approach towards a difficult problem" was not necessary to decide the
case. 40 3 Of course, it still signaled to the world that it would likely approve
the same in the future. Notably, however, it remains unclear whether the
continuing-royalty approach was taken without the parties' consent.
In 1974, the same court decided Fosterv. American Machine & Foundry
Co.,404 a decision on which there can be no splitting of hairs. The trial
court by interlocutory order in August 1968 held that the plaintiffs patent
was valid and infringed and initially signaled it would enter a final
injunction. 40 5 In September 1968, the court then reconsidered the remedy
and denied the plaintiff a final injunction because he did not practice the
invention and had not licensed it.406 The matter was referred to a special
master to assess the plaintiffs damages, and while that was pending, the
interlocutory finding of infringement was affirmed in 1969.407 The master
completed his report in September 1972, and it reflected the defendant's
infringements prior to that date. The damages amounted to $344,000 at a
special royalty rate of $20.408 This, of course, was nothing out of the
ordinary-the award was entirely backward looking.
But the trial judge did more. In December 1972, the court tentatively
approved the master's report and stated that "future sales should be
accounted for by virtue of a judgment 'consonant with the notion of a
compulsory licensing agreement." 409 When the judge finally approved the
report in February 1973, he inserted the following provision into the final
judgment:
401. Royal-McBee, 295 F.2d at 3.

402. Id.
403. Id. at 6.
404. 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974).
405. Foster v. Magnetic Heating Corp., 297 F. Supp. 512, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

406. See Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, 7-8, 10,
app. lb, Foster v. Magnetic Heating Corp., 419 U.S. 833 (1974) (No. 73-1744) [hereinafter

Respondents' Brief].
407. Foster v. Magnetic Heating Corp., 410 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1969).
408. Foster,492 F.2d at 1322.

409. Respondents' Brief, supra note 406, at 10 (quoting Foster v. Magnetic Heating
Corp., No. 65 Civil 1114 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1972) (order denying injunction), reprinted in

Respondents' Brief, supra note 406, app. at 14b).
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Defendants... shall pay to plaintiff the sum of $20 per kilowatt of the
rated output power of each [infringing product] sold or leased by them
from the date of the filing of the Master's Report (September 22, 1972)
until the expiration date of the Foster patent (April 14, 1976) for use in the
United States in the production of [piping] .... 410
The Second Circuit expressly approved the order, citing the dictum of
Royal-McBee.4 11 Interestingly, the plaintiff sought certiorari on this point,
but the Supreme Court denied the petition. 4 12 The petition was poorly
written. If the following is any indication of the petition's quality, the
4 13
plaintiff inserted seven exclamation marks into the petition for emphasis.
Assuming arguendo that these U.S. decisions are relevant, it is difficult to
state that Royal-McBee and Foster represented the general state of the
common law at the time the Copyright Act was enacted in 1976. For one,
the cases involved patents, rather than copyrights. And though that alone
should not be dispositive, one cannot help but consider the two rights are
not identical. Second, one cannot forget that the cases were watershed,
breakaway cases coming from a sole circuit. No other circuit court relied
on either case before 1976, and their effect in district courts prior to that
date was slight. In 1974 and 1975, two district courts in patent cases cited
Royal-McBee in dicta for the proposition that a continuing royalty might be
proper. 4 14 Additionally, no reported decision cited Foster for its holding on
continuing royalties until 1997, when a trial court applied it. 4 15 Admittedly,
the Second Circuit holds a lofty position in the eyes of the law because of
its history and size. But even so, Royal-McBee and Foster can only be
described as holding an unusual position in 1976.
3. Cases Decided After 1976 but Before eBay
The remaining cases that are often cited by post-eBay cases and scholars
as support for continuing royalties all occur well after the patent and
copyright statutes were enacted in 1952 and 1976, respectively. First and
foremost are the several Supreme Court decisions discussed previously in
410. Foster v. Magnetic Heating Corp., No. 65 Civil 1114 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1973) (order
adopting report of the special master), reprintedin Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 34, 36,
Foster,396 U.S. 829 (No. 73-1744).
411. Foster,492 F.2d at 1324.
412. 419 U.S. 833 (1974).
413. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 410, at 4-10.
414. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft v. Beltone Elecs. Corp., 407 F. Supp. 807, 811 (N.D. I11.
1975); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Berwick Indus., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 851, 870 (M.D. Pa.
1974). Another case in 1969 did not cite Royal-McBee, but might have been influenced by
it. See Allied Research Prods., Inc. v. Heatbath Corp., 300 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. I11.1969).
There, the court denied a final injunction because the plaintiff had refused to license its
patent to the defendant for personal reasons. The court held that this was "unfair
discrimination" and that the defendant was "entitled to be licensed by plaintiffs on the same
royalty basis as plaintiffs were granting licenses to other manufacturers who were competing
with plaintiffs and defendants." Id. at 657. The decision is bizarre and wrong.
415. Ramp Research & Dev., Inc. v. Structural Panels, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 1169, 1178-79
(S.D. Fla. 1997), rev'don other grounds, 230 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

2010]

PROSPECTIVE COMPENSATION

1727

Part III.A. I have already shown that the pertinent statements are
unconsidered dicta. As for lower court decisions, most also simply state in
obiter dicta that continuing royalties are permissible. 4 16 One case alluded to
as much.4 17 Another approved of the royalty rate set by a judge, but it does
not seem that the royalty as an award per se was raised on appeal. 4 18 And
yet another court actually ordered a compulsory license, but that was then
reversed on appeal on other grounds. 4 19 Obviously, given the dates of those
decisions, we cannot assume Congress contemplated that they would fill the
interstices of the statutes.
D. The InapplicabilityofAntitrust Remedies
In a prior discussion, I noted that the Federal Circuit in Paice LLC v.
Toyota Motor Corp.420 cited Supreme Court precedent that permits
continuing royalties on patents where necessary to prevent anticompetitive
behavior. It is true that the Court has expressly allowed royalties in such
cases. 42 1 One could thus argue that the Court's decisions in the antitrust
context are erroneous because they permit an equitable remedy that the
English Chancellor did not recognize circa 1789. But those decisions are
more easily and correctly dispatched on the ground that federal courts
actually have statutory authority under the antitrust laws to grant
compulsory licenses of patents and copyrights as a means of restraining
anticompetitive behavior. The antitrust cases therefore make for poor
analogies in assessing whether a similar remedy is permissible as a matter
of a federal court's default equitable powers in cases where an ongoing
copyright or patent infringement (rather than antitrust violation) is at issue.
Breaking monopolies apart sometimes requires the assignment or
licensing of intellectual-property rights from the right holder to another
entity. 422 Section 4 of the Sherman Act expressly empowers courts to
prevent and restrain its violation. 423 The provision is much broader than the
provisions contained in the patent and copyright acts. It is not limited to
416. E.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 932 n.19 (2d Cir. 1994);
New Era Publ'ns Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 585 (2d Cir. 1989); Abend
v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 976 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich.
Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1397 (6th Cir. 1996) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting).
417. Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., 368 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2004).
418. Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
419. Ramp Research & Dev., 977 F. Supp. at 1178-79.
420. See supra text accompanying note 55.
421. See United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 59 (1973). For a summary of
the case law, see William C. Holmes, Compulsory Patent and Trademark Licensing: A
Frameworkfor Analysis, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 44-52 (1980).
422. See generally 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 707j, at 211-12,
710, at

236-45 (2d ed. 2002).
423. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) ("The several district courts of the United States are invested
with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of sections 1 to 7 of this title; . . . such
violation[s] shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited.").
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injunctions, and it broadly permits relief to prevent anticompetitive
behavior. Similarly broad language may be found in the Clayton Act,
which invests courts with jurisdiction "to prevent and restrain violations of
this Act."' 424 Quite simply, if a defendant wishes to take advantage of a
compulsory license under the scheme recognized by the antitrust cases cited
in Paice, he or she should then make out a case against the plaintiff under
the antitrust statutes themselves.
VIII. THE STANDARD FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF REDUX

One of the consequences of misunderstanding the authority to grant
prospective compensation is that federal courts have misapplied the
standard for injunctive relief as well. Many post-eBay decisions that have
denied final injunctions to prevailing plaintiffs have done so erroneously.
The courts have committed two errors. First, courts deny injunctions in part
because they believe they are authorized to impose prospective
compensation instead and that therefore another remedy exists that can
adequately compensate plaintiffs. I have already demonstrated that this
avenue is unavailable to federal courts.
Second, courts state that
prospective compensation-whether a continuing royalty or a lump-sum
award-constitutes an adequate remedy at law. It is this second mistake
that I address here. The mistake demonstrates that some courts have failed
to properly understand and adhere to the equity-law distinction.
Many courts have actually stripped themselves of their jurisdiction in
equity to award the very alternative prospective compensation that they
have granted. As I have already explained, 425 the Judiciary Act of 1789
limited the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases where there
was no adequate remedy at law. Though Congress repealed that section in
1948, the repeal had no effect on the substantive rules of equity, nor did the
merger of law and equity procedure in 1938. Thus, the fusion of the two
426
systems is incomplete, much as it is in other common-law systems.

424. 15 U.S.C. § 25.
425. See supra Part V.B.1.
426. Courts in England, Australia, and New Zealand have grappled with whether the
combination of law and equity procedure in their countries eliminated all distinctions
between law and equity. See generally McDERMOTT, supra note 232, at 105-06; R. P.
MEAGHER, J. D. HEYDON & M. J. LEEMNG, EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES 52-54 (4th
ed. 2002). The answer is that many substantive distinctions remain. See Jill Martin, Fusion,
Fallacy and Confusion; A Comparative Study, 1994 CONV. & PROP. LAW. (N.S.) 13; Julie
Maxton, Some Effects of the Intermingling of Common Law and Equity, 5 CANTERBURY L.
REv. 299 (1993); Michael Tilbury, Fallacy or Furphy?: Fusion in a Judicature World, 26

U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 357 (2003). For a call to discard the baggage associated with whether
a claim, remedy, or defense was historically legal or equitable, see ANDREW BURROWS,
FUSING COMMON LAW AND EQUITY: REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND REFORM 3 (2001); Andrew
Burrows, We Do This at Common Law but That in Equity, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1

(2002).
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The inadequate-remedy-at-law requirement remains "jurisdictional" in a
42 7
sense, albeit not with the same significance as subject-matter jurisdiction.
Judgments rendered without subject-matter jurisdiction are void ab initio,
and party consent cannot cure the defect. 42 8 The same is not true of equity
jurisdiction. An equitable remedy that issues where there is an adequate
remedy at law remains enforceable until overturned. 429 The parties can also
expressly or implicitly consent to equity jurisdiction in cases where
ordinarily there would be none. 4 30 But if timely objected to, an improper
exercise of equity jurisdiction constitutes an abuse of discretion that courts
can correct on appeal.
The Supreme Court has confirmed that the sine qua non of equitable
relief is still the "inadequacy of legal remedies." 4 31 The principle applies
not only to injunctive relief, but to any form of equitable relief in federal
court. 4 3 2 Implicit within the requirement is that if there is an adequate
remedy at law, then the plaintiff must make do with that remedy and cannot
resort to any other in equity. 433 The rule also acts prophylactically to help
preserve the right to a jury trial. A party cannot be forced to face an
equitable remedy at a bench trial when an adequate remedy, and thus a right
434
to a jury trial, would be available at law.
There are exceptions to the inadequacy requirement. The first is where
the subject matter of the suit falls within the traditional concurrent
jurisdiction of a court of equity. 4 35 I have recently argued that copyright
cases that seek injunctions fall under equity's concurrent jurisdiction, thus
making inadequacy irrelevant. 4 36 Courts have yet to consider that
argument, however, and we must proceed assuming they may not adopt it.
The second exception is where Congress specifically empowers a court to
award an equitable remedy without incorporating traditional equitable
limitations. 437 The copyright statute, for example, entitles a copyright
427. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.7, at 179-80 (2d ed. 1993); 1
POMEROY, supra note 176, §§ 129-130, at 153-58.
428. See United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 229 (1938).
429. See generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 427, § 2.8(6), at 213.
430. See Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 181 (1935).
431. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982); see also Sampson v.
Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07
(1959). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 945, at 597-98 (1979) (proposing a new
approach to adequacy); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE

265-83 (1991) (same).
432. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1992).
433. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 427, § 2.5(1), at 127.
434. See Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94 (1932); Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S.
106, 110 (1891); Green v. Stewart, 45 N.Y.S. 982, 983 (App. Div. 1897).
435. G6mez-Arostegui, supra note 3, at 1277-79. The Supreme Court has held, however,
that the existence of traditional concurrent jurisdiction may not necessarily affect the right to
ajury trial. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 506-07.
436. G6mez-Arostegui, supra note 3, at 1277-79. My article was limited to copyright
cases and did not purport to argue (nor exclude the possibility) that concurrent jurisdiction
would apply to patent cases.
437. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-94 (1978).
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owner to recover the defendant's profits-an equitable remedy. 438 Nothing
in the statute, however, requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that her remedies
at law-actual damages or statutory damages-are inadequate before the
profits become recoverable. 4 39 This second exception cannot apply to
440
prospective compensation given the language of the applicable statutes.
How is it, then, that federal courts can grant the equitable remedy of
prospective compensation when they have just held that the plaintiff has an
adequate remedy at law? The simple answer is they cannot. Courts with a
proper understanding of equity recognize as much, and when they deny a
final injunction on the ground an adequate remedy exists at law, the
principal remedy they leave the plaintiff is successive actions at law for past
damages.
Naturally, litigants sometimes consider successive actions
inadequate, and courts have declared that successive actions are often an
inadequate remedy. 44 1 Thus it would technically be more correct to say that
there is no adequate remedy at law-thereby triggering equitable
"jurisdiction"-but that an injunction should nevertheless be denied
because there is no irreparable injury. Losses from future infringements
would then be reparable by another remedy in equity. 442 Alternatively, a
court could deny a final injunction because of the public interest.
Of course, this would not aid courts that desire to award continuing
royalties or lump-sum damages for postjudgment infringements. Holding
as much simply triggers an equitable jurisdiction to award remedies that
existed and were being administered by the English Court of Chancery
around 1789, namely an injunction. By ruling as they did, many courts
placed themselves into a feedback loop and, as a result, many of the
injunctions that they denied should probably have been granted instead.
IX. CONCLUSION

eBay has dropped a bombshell on the federal courts. They have been told
to more rigorously screen requests for final injunctions and as a
consequence injunctions have been denied more frequently than in the past.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not indicate what relief, if any, lower
courts should award in lieu of a final injunction where the plaintiff
prevailed on the merits. Courts have turned to their "equitable powers" to
craft what they believe are appropriate alternative remedies, some of which
are sensible in the abstract.

438. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006).
439. Accord Sheldon v. Moredall Realty Corp., 95 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1938).
440. See supra Part IV.

441. For English copyright cases, see Lawrence v. Smith, Jac. 471, 472, 37 Eng. Rep.
928, 928-29 (Ch. 1822); Rundell v. Murray, Jac. 311, 314, 37 Eng. Rep. 868, 869 (Ch.

1821). For an English patent case, see Harmer v. Plane, 14 Ves. jun. 130, 132, 33 Eng. Rep.
470, 471 (Ch. 1807).

442. For more on the potential differences between the inadequate-remedy-at-law and
irreparable-injury requirements, see G6mez-Arostegui, supra note 3, at 1205 n. 17.
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As this Article has shown, however, federal courts actually have no
power to order lump-sum awards or continuing royalties in lieu of a final
injunction as either a matter of common law or equity. The most that
federal judges can do is encourage the parties to expressly consent to some
form of prospective compensation. For example, a plaintiff who has lost a
motion for a final injunction after trial can conditionally stipulate to an
award of a continuing royalty in lieu of the injunction in the abstract, and
simply reserve the right to appeal the denial of the injunction and the
royalty rate.443 Barring a zealous appellate court, litigants can largely
control this remedial portion of the litigation. If a plaintiff refuses to
stipulate, however, then courts must permit her to sue again at a later date.
Only Congress has the power to alter this state of affairs and empower
courts to impose compulsory licenses. Congress is in the best position to
carefully consider and balance the interests of right holders and of those
who infringe those rights. It is also the only institution that can free the
courts from most of the artifacts of the law and equity distinction that
remain today. For instance, Congress can permit courts to consider
prospective compensation as a basis for denying a final injunction despite
the fact those remedies are equitable. And Congress can statutorily provide
plaintiffs a right to a jury trial for prospective compensation where they
otherwise might not have a right under the Seventh Amendment. A
plaintiff would thus not need to pursue the defendant in a subsequent suit.
Congress needs guidance on how best to proceed. This Article has
provided fodder on some issues, but left many others untreated. I will soon
address many of them in another article. But in the meantime, I am hopeful
that my conclusions will prompt courts to recognize the limits of their
powers and further spur stakeholders to redirect their attention to the
legislative process.

443. E.g., Joyal Prods., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04-5172 (JAP), 2009 WL
512156, at *13-14 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2009).

Notes & Observations

